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Abstract
The implementation of identity politics policies conceived at a supranational level
appears to motivate the coordination of populist movements, the radicalization of their
discourses, and an increasing resentment towards minority groups. I investigate the reaction of
populist sovereignist political movements, among recently admitted EU member states, to the
implementation of European Union policies that involve the positive discrimination of minority
groups and mandated refugee relocations. The implementation of such policies seems to have
contributed to the resentment toward policy-favored minorities, the increase of anti-immigration
values, the success of extremist political expressions, and the mistrust of political institutions and
traditional parties. The research relies on a multiple case studies approach to identify the effects
of the implementation of EU-mandated affirmative action and immigration policies. The political
and economic landscapes of study cases, taken from post-communist Eastern Europe (primarily,
Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary), are described based on the existing literature. The general
arguments are supported through a review of quantitative studies that incorporate regression
analyses on electoral data and web content analysis. Arguments are also complemented by a
review of World Bank, OECD and Eurostat reports, election results, as well as the theoretical
literature on ethnic competition, welfare spending, multiculturalism, and the specifics of the
political parties and systems of the selected countries.
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Chapter 1
Introduction: Historical &Theoretical Background

I. National Sovereignty, Radicalism and Populism
Radical expressions of nationalism, like those often found among populist political
platforms, have seen an uptick in popularity across both Western and Eastern Europe in recent
years (Jones, 2007). New protectionist radical left and populist right parties have forcefully entered
the political arenas of various European countries (Mudde, 2007; March 2012; Chiocchetti, 2016).
What explains the increasing popularity of such movements? Might it be attributed to the EUrequired implementation of minority-protection and free-market enhancing policies (e.g.
redistributive social welfare, opening of borders, market integration)? What economic conditions
contribute to the attractiveness of such political expressions?
This research is an effort to explain why populist movements have been especially prolific
in European politics in recent years, rising to the forefront of the political scenes in countries such
as Hungary, Poland, the U.K., Austria and Sweden. I propose a theoretical template, which
incorporates the economic precarity of citizens in these countries, the process of EU accession,
and the EU's handling of certain issues like the refugee crisis in 2015, to explain why populist
movements have been able to garner political success and why an apparent natural progression to
radicalism seems to be taking place.
Citizens may find themselves in a position of economic precarity because they lack the
education necessary to enter knowledge based economic sectors. The same individuals may
inhabit regions, whos economies have incorporated outdated industries (e.g. labor-intensive
1

agriculture, mining, crude manufacturing) that have been adversely affected by economic
liberalization because they fail to remain competitive against open market forces. After EU
accession, such regions did improve subtly because of regional development funding, but did not
experience the same resounding success that modern regions, which incorporated knowledgebased sectors, experienced from the streamlined economic coordination that came from EU
membership. This situation has contributed to significant regional economic disparities,
exhibited especially in the case studies on Slovakia and Hungary detailed in Chapter 2. These
economic conditions also seem to have fostered the type of political discontent among citizens,
where economically struggling individuals perceive that they have been dealt an unfair deal
through EU accession, which provides populist political entrepreneurs with an initial foundation
of support.
When countries enter the EU, they are also mandated to comply with supranational policy
directives, of which certain policies (e.g. national Roma integration strategies framework) require
member states to tailor economic assistance programs specifically directed to minority groups
which have experienced integration problems (discussed further below). Such EU policy
mandates, coupled with a dissafected population already experiencing lagging economic
conditions, appear to have provided political entrepreneurs with the fertile ground they need to
spin a campaign of rhetoric against the EU and minority groups. Such rhetoric (detailed in
subsequent chapters) attacks the EU for unfairly undermining national political autonomy, while
claiming that such assistance programs force the redirection of scarce economic resources, which
should be used to help the 'native' population, to an undeserving, parasitic minority. Such rhetoric
will be evidenced in all the case studies below (Slovakia, Poland, Hungary). These tactics seem to
be especially prevalent for their ability to appeal to a fundamental human psychology. As will be
2

seen, populist political entrepreneurs attempt to spin such policy mandates in terms of a coalitional
threat against the sovereignty of their respective countries. From the perspective of citizens on the
ground, the effectiveness of such rhetoric relies more on how political issues are perceived, rather
than how they truly exist.
When thousands of refugees from the war-torn Middle East and North Africa fled to
Europe in 2015, a substantial burden on Italy and Greece who received a disproportionate number
of refugees. The EU would intervene by mandating compliance with an obligatory relocation
scheme (discussed further in Chapter 2), through European Council decisions 2015/1523 and
2015/1601, which called for the relocation of 40,000 (2015/1523) and 120,000 (2015/1601)
asylum seekers (European Commission, 2015). Member states were obligated to accept an EU
allocated number of such persons to maintain legal compliance. The policy appears to have been
an issue capable inciting immense scrutiny from populist movements throughout Europe (detailed
in subsequent chapters). Populist political entrepreneurs would use the situation to fuel their
rhetoric, by claiming that the EU's handling of the issue was a threat to national sovereignty and
security. Rhetoric would frame the situation as a security threat by calling for the militarization of
borders and the erection of border walls. Political entrepreneurs would also claim that the
introduction of 'culturally foreign' individuals, who were argued to be culturally incompatible,
would raise integration concerns, leading to the development of isolated communities prone to
extremism. In all the case studies detailed below, it appears that the refugee crisis, and the EU's
obligatory relocation scheme, was the central issue that provided populist political entrepreneurs
with the fertile ground they needed to crystalize their support.
Labeling a political movement 'radical' means what exactly? Mudde (2007) notes that the
term 'radical', in its modern usage, is often associated with right-wing political expressions, even
3

though the term was originally used to label the militant left during the French revolution. Today
‘radical’ is still used to qualify left-wing parties such as the French Parti Radical de Gauche
(Radical Left Party) (Mudde, 2007, pp. 24 - 25). For Mudde (2007), examining the typical political
messaging of the radical movements should facilitate the more precise operationalization of the
concept of radicalism. It often contains anti-establishment expressions, incorporating virulent
attacks against institutions, social programs, and statutes of liberal democracies. Critiques of
political pluralism and constitutional provisions to protect social constituencies (e.g. minorities,
refugees) figure prominently in such attacks (Betz & Johnson, 2004). For this study, a political
movement is considered 'radical' when it incorporates in its political platform demands for drastic
institutional changes and explicit, strong and definitional expressions of intolerance for a
mainstream political system.
How to identify and operationalize political populism properly has also been the subject of
much debate (see Mudde 2004; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012; Mudde, 2013). This political family
is often categorized as 'anti-political establishment' (e.g. Abedi & Schneider, 2004). The
exploitation of political resentment and discontentment are generally at the core of the identity of
such political coordination (Lane & Ersson, 1999). There is some consensus in the literature that
populism typically incorporates an opportunistic and simplified political signaling aimed at
triggering its audience’s gut reactions (e.g. Taggart, 2004; Mudde 2004; Mudde & Kaltwasser,
2012; Mudde, 2013; De Spiegeleire, S., Skinner, C., & Sweijs, T., 2017). For the purpose of this
study, this set of features would not stand as a reliable operationalization because they are
relatively subjective. Furthermore, mainstream parties have often partially incorporated such
features too. Mudde (2004, 2013) defines populism as " an ideology that considers society to be
ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the
4

corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the
people" (2013, p. 3). Who might belong to the category of 'the pure people' varies in accordance
with the success of this or that specific political entrepreneur or movements. The depiction of the
political elite as a main enemy, however, seems to be a constant in populist discourses. Stanley
(2008) offers a similar criterion for operationalizing populism. Such political movements
incorporate rhetoric highlighting (1) “The existence of two homogeneous social units: ‘the people’
and ‘the elite’”, (2) an antagonistic relationship between those two groups, (3) the question of
national sovereignty, and (4) a positive portrayal of 'the people', opposed to a demonization of 'the
elite' (Stanley, 2008, p. 108).
In the present study I identify populism through the analysis of political rhetoric portraying
the idea of a fundamental antagonism between a parasitic political elite and an imagined
homogeneous gemeinschaft. Political rhetoric is assessed by analyzing the framing methods
implemented by burgeoning political entrepreneurs in each respective case study. More recent
evidence of such rhetoric is gathered from the websites and social media platforms implemented
by radical parties. To assess the temporal trajectory for such rhetoric, publications detailing each
movements history and past strategies are included.
Hungary's Jobbik party is a perfect example of European populism. Also known as the
movement for a better Hungary, the Jobbik party has won considerable popular and electoral
support. It has emerged as Hungary's third largest party in the National Assembly since it
obtained 20 percent of the votes in the 2014 parliamentary elections (Karacsony & Rona, 2011;
Varga, 2014). The Jobbik party has met great success after its adoption of a political platform
that includes left-wing populist economic policies (i.e. anti-free market), social conservatism,
and hostilities toward minorities (Kovacs, 2013). Jobbik displays the typical features
5

characteristic of populist movements in its endorsement of a nativist stance – emphasizing a pure
people with a history and a territory – and a staunch criticism of the European Union.
The present study focuses on the factors (e.g. economic precarity, policy implementation)
that might have contributed to the increase in popularity of the European populist movements.
Specifically, the attention is focused on the study of former soviet satellite states - Slovakia,
Hungary, and Poland - that have recently undergone the transition from communism to
representative democracy. During a relatively brief period of liberalization and democratization
(spanning approximately 15 years each), these three countries have experienced social
contestations of the communist polity, the generalization of free market exchanges, the
development of democratic political institutions, and the efforts to accede into the European Union.
The swift political changes that have occurred in Eastern Europe, especially the rapid transition
from socialism to capitalism, came with rapid and dramatic disruptions of the social world, which
seem to have encouraged political movements promoting ‘radical’ policies. These policies include
overhauling the various institutions (e.g. judiciary, electoral laws, parliamentary representation)
which support a stable set of checks and balances, to centralize and consolidate power (discussed
further in Chapter 3). Radical ideas, also perpetuated by the same political movements, involve a
radical anti-minority (e.g. Jews, Roma) discourse, which frames such groups as a threat to national
sovereignty.
II. Post-Communist Societies – A Historical Background
From socialism to capitalism.
Prior to the revolutionary agitation that started in 1989, several Eastern and Central
European states (i.e. the Eastern Bloc) were under direct soviet rule and treated as satellite states
6

of the Soviet Union. Beginning in Poland, eventually spreading to other countries such as Hungary,
Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Bulgaria, swift revolutions dismantled the communist control
apparatus (Kuran, 1991). Post-revolutionary time, incipient market economies emerged in the
recently liberated countries. However, economic conditions and living standards eventually
deteriorated during the protracted process of democratization (Pridham & Vanhanen, 2002).
In Poland, a comprehensive overhaul of the governments political institutions was
undertaken, which involved regional power devolution and comprehensive administrative reforms
(Nunberg, 1999). Following Round Table discussions in 1989 between Solidarność, a trade union
movement that had been spearheading the opposition to the communist rule, and the communist
government, a parliamentary system was established, which incorporated proportional voting
(Nunberg, 1999). During the same period, new political parties materialized that appealed to
divergent pockets of an already fragmented electorate. A contentious issue of the time was the
extent and the breadth of the government decentralization. Social Democrats advocated moving
most administrative control to local entities, while post-socialist coalitions favored maintaining a
stronger centralized administrative authority (Nunberg, 1999). Though coalition governments of
the era were relatively unstable, they remained functional, meeting the major legislative demands
associated with the burdens of democratization and transitioning to a market economy.
When Hungary began its transition to an open society model of governance in 1989, it did
so with a slight economic advantage over other Eastern European countries, given its higher living
standards and pre-existing market-responsive economic policies (The World Bank Group, 2003).
Under pressure from the street, the Communist Party relented and quickly after, in October of
1989, the parliament passed legislation that allowed a multi-party parliamentary and direct
presidential election (Brown, 1991). A center-right coalition, led by the Democratic Forum (MDF),
7

garnered 60 percent of the votes, which earned it a parliamentary majority (Brown, 1991).
Although the initial economic reforms were successful in attracting foreign investments, by the
mid 1990's fiscal deficits would largely be responsible for an economic decline (discussed further
in Chapter 2), spurring additional comprehensive structural reforms (The World Bank Group,
2003).
Following Poland and Hungary, in November of 1989 Czechoslovakia underwent its own
nezna revolucia ('gentle revolution’), launched with large protests from students and dissidents
(Glenn, 1999). By December of 1989, Czechoslovakia adopted a coalition government that was
still partially controlled by a communist minority. In June of 1990, Czechoslovakia held its first
free parliamentary and federal elections, which ushered in a political regime that has been
described as authoritarian in nature (Pridham & Vanhanen, 2002). Movements coordinated by
President Vaclav Havel, among which the Czech Civic Forum (center left) and the Slovak Public
Against Violence (center left), were able to command a strong majority in the House of the People
and the House of Nations (the two chambers of Czechoslovakia's Federal Assembly). The coalition
also attempted to firmly entrench its power by coercing other political parties into the coalition
(Pridham & Vanhanen, 2002). After the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in January of 1993,
Slovakia formed a ministerial coalition government with proportional representation in parliament.
Through the mid 1990's, rivalries between coalitions with divergent political agendas impeded a
quick and smooth opening to a market economy and led to the failure of initial attempts to join the
European Union (Pridham, 1999).
The Accession Process
As economic and political conditions somewhat improved in the second half of the 1990’s,
several leaderships of Central and Eastern European countries engaged in negotiations to join the
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E.U. Poland entered into negotiations the earliest in 1993. Hungary started its negotiations in 1998.
And in 2003 Slovakia followed suit. On May 1st, 2004, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland were among
10 new countries admitted in the EU.
European Union accession is contingent upon properly addressing the common legal rights
and fundamental freedoms outlined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
as stipulated in Article 6 of the Treaty of the European Union (Official Journal of European
Communities, 2002). This is done primarily through the transposition of the body of laws and
regulations previously adopted by the European Union – also known as the Community Acquis –
in the national legislations of the country to be admitted. E.U. directives about multiculturalism
and equality are some of such dispositions that must be transposed in the national legislation of
any new member state. Those directives include stipulations about (1) the prevention of
discrimination against ethnic minorities, (2) the guarantee of free movement of workers regardless
of their ethnicity, and (3) the protection of equal employment opportunity for men and women.
For instance, the European Council directive 2000/43/EC stipulates that all EU member states shall
adopt minimal requirements in their legislation to combat xenophobia and racism.
All member states must also participate in EU programs supporting ethnic minorities. In
most of Europe, the Roma have been largely maintained segregated from the national communities
in which they reside. In 2011, the EU council adopted the National Framework for Roma
Integration Strategies (NRIS) platform that was elaborated in conjunction with various
organizations of the civil society (European Commission, 2014). The platform facilitates the
coordination of the development of policies for the inclusion of Roma communities across member
states. The NRIS includes EU-wide council measures and directives, as well as country-specific
policy recommendations to combat discrimination and to improve living conditions of the Roma
9

minority (European Commission, 2014). These measures and policy recommendations largely
focus on the means to improve employment and educational outcomes through Roma-specific
programs.

Member

states

receive

EU

funding

through

the

European Regional

Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social Fund (ESF) to develop such programs.
The transposition of the Community Acquis, which entails a partial relinquishment of
national autonomy, has not been without opposition. During the preparation to the EU accession,
‘single-issue' parties had already started to emerge in Eastern Europe, with platforms entirely
defined by their Euroscepticism. (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002). In Poland, far-right parties gained
considerable popularity immediately before and upon accession to the EU in 2004 (Pankowski,
2010). The Polish Peasant Party (PSL) provides a perfect example of the dynamics at play. The
PSL is a successor to a former satellite communist party, representing the interests of both rural
and capitalist farmers. As Kopecky & Mudde (2002) point out, Polish agriculture was confronted
with the EU requirement of opening its market to competition during the accession negotiations.
As such, prior to and during the process of EU accession, the PSL redefined its party platform on
hard-lined EU accession negotiations, endorsing protectionism. The PSL, along with the SelfDefence of Poland (Samoobrona), a far-right populist party also representing agricultural interests,
quickly emerged as the strongest sceptics of EU integration (Kopecky & Mudde, 2004).
III. Research Questions
The emergence of populist parties in Poland, as well as other parts of Eastern Europe, may
be related to resentment over a perceived loss of national sovereignty (Grabbe, 2003). In situations
where communities are in precarious economic conditions, resentment toward policies that would
privilege the interests of some groups over others is quick to emerge. Naturally, although
underdeveloped regions have benefitted from EU funds, those in need of assistance are likely to
10

perceive such policies as an unfair allocation of national resources. This may lead to suspicion
about the legitimacy of political action and the fairness of political institutions. Such resentment
seems to be compounded through the political rhetoric of political entrepreneurs that attack the
legitimacy of the EU and obligatory minority and refugee assistance programs. The research
investigates if certain factors (e.g. the popularity of populist movements, resentment of minorities,
losses of trust in EU institutions, the radicalization of populist rhetoric) have changed after
accession to the EU and the adoption of minority assistance policies conceived at the supranational
level. This study will address the following specific questions:
1a.

Does political discontent seem to emerge more in economically underdeveloped regions,

which have not benefitted substantially, relative to more developed regions, from economic
liberalization and EU accession?
1b. Are increases in the popularity of populist movements, distrust of mainstream political parties
and the European Union, and increases in the resentment of minority groups, more likely in regions
that are underdeveloped economically?
2. Has there been a marked change in how populist movements express themselves politically (e.g.
emphasis on specific issues, rhetorical framing strategies) in Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia since
the refugee crisis in 2015?
IV. Methodology
The research utilizes a systematic multiple case studies approach to investigate the
situational template and research questions mentioned above. Case studies will focus specifically
on the former communist countries of Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary, which have all experienced
a protracted period of economic development after undertaking post-transition economic
11

liberalization, contain significant regional economic disparities, have seen radicalized activity
from populist political movements, and have undertaken the institutional changes associated to EU
accession (all being involved in the 2004 EU expansion). In addition to the specific case studies,
general arguments are supported by evidence (e.g. social survey data, public rhetoric, voting
results) from similar situations throughout Europe, where populist movements have seen an uptick
in popularity, including the U.K., Sweden, Austria and Italy.
In all the case studies addressed, a level of systematicity is adhered to, in which the political
systems, political parties, economic factors (e.g. regional disparities, GDP trends, GINI, sector
development), and reaction to specific political issues (e.g. refugee relocation, EU minority
assistance programs) is incorporated. Underpinning research questions 1a and 1b is an argument
regarding economic precarity and its potential for providing populist political entrepreneurs with
a fertile ground to spread their messages. To investigate the effect of economic precarity, a regional
analysis is provided for each case study which incorporates data on regional GDP trends, regional
reliance on certain economic sectors, and GINI coefficients, obtained from reputable research
firms such as the World Bank and Office of Economic Coordination and Development (OECD).
Economic data is then supported by election data showing where specific parties did well.
Statistical regressions that analyze the regional determinants motivating voting behavior (e.g.
unemployment, education, minority population) are included in the Slovakia and Hungary case
studies for additional support. If it is observed that populist parties do well specifically in
economically underdeveloped regions, and support is increasing during relevent periods, such as
the refugee crisis, implementation of minority assistance programs, and various litigation
announcements made by the EU for legal noncompliance, this would see to support question 1a.

12

The inclusion of GINI coefficients, which serve as a measure for income inequality, is
especially relevent for determining the economic underpinnings behind political discontent and
societal instability (Nagel 1974). A given country's GINI coefficient reflects inequalities inherent
in that country's wealth (income) distribution, which is commonly referred to as the Lorenz curve
(Subramanian, 2002). The Lorenz curve plots income percentiles, among the population, along its
X axis and cumulative income along its Y axis. The GINI coefficient is effectively double the area
between the Lorenz curve and a line that should reflect perfect income equality (Investopedia,
2018). As Subramanian (2002) puts it, the GINI coefficient can be thought of simplistically as, "in
‘equivalent’ welfare terms [...] the proportion of a cake of given size going to the poorer of two
individuals in a two-person cake-sharing problem" (p. 1). The GINI coefficient ranges from values
of 0 to 1, where a value of 0 would indicate perfect income equality, and a value of 1 would indicate
total inequality (where the top income percentile would reap all the income in a respective country)
(World Bank Group, 2018; Investopedia, 2018). It's important to note that a country may very well
have a high absolute income, but if significant inequalities exist, such a country can still have a
high GINI coefficient. A body of empirical research has suggested that income inequality (as
evidenced through GINI), and individuals' negative assessments of their relative economic
standing, is a significant motivator behind political discontent (Nagel, 1974; Nafziger & Auvinen,
2002; Sigelman & Simpson, 1977; Lichbach, 1989). In all the case studies addressed in this
research (i.e. Slovakia, Hungary, Poland), it can be observed that the GINI coefficient increased
significantly after EU accession.
To assess factors underpinning research questions 1b and 2 (e.g. regional attraction of
populist movements, rhetorical framing strategies), evidence of populist political rhetoric is
provided, collected through published reports online social media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter)
13

behavior, media reports, peer-reviewed academic articles (e.g. web content analysis studies), and
survey studies implemented by public policy research firms. If it is observed that an increase in
the radicalization of rhetoric regarding the EU and minority assistance programs is being
exhibited by parties, that are also finding their support base in economically precarious regions
(as evidenced through election results), it can be inferred that citizens in these regions are indeed
perceiving such programs negatively. Survey data results can also shed light on issues regarding
trust in the EU, and mainstream parties, among such supporters. Finally, through the evidence of
rhetoric, including its specific framing and frequency during relevent periods, research question
2 can be supported.
V. Theoretical Background
Economic precarity, niche overlap & ethnic competition
This research will pay specific attention to regions that seem to offer a fertile ground to
political entrepreneurs seeking to gain power through populist movements (both from the Left and
the Right). That is, regions where there is high unemployment, low income, regional GDP far
below the EU average, and a significant presence of minority populations. Individuals sharing a
common identity finding themselves in precarious economic conditions (e.g. low income,
unemployed) may perceive to be in competition over scarce resources (e.g. jobs, welfare benefits)
with members of other socially distinct groups. Typically, these distinct groups will be comprised
by those perceived as outsiders from the majority, whether through recent migration waves
(newcomers), or through persistent and long-lasting social exclusion. When there is a visible social
distinction, because such groups may carry with them different cultural markers or phenotypic
features, political entrepreneurs that seek to capitalize on such situations are likely to frame these
perceived problems in terms of ethnic opposition (Olzak, 1992). Prior research investigating this
14

phenomenon largely focused on immigration (Esses et al. 2001; Citrin et al. 1997). Composition
and scale of the fluxes greatly impact the perceived threat associated with immigration, where a
large-scale influx during a short window of time is generally perceived as more salient and
threatening (Olzak, 1992; Schneider, 2008).
Central to ethnic competition theory is the concept of niche overlap, in which minority
groups attempt to enter economic niches already occupied by segments of the majority population
(Hannan, 1979; Barth, 1998). Those framed, by political entrepreneurs, as categorical outsiders to
the majority population (e.g. asylum-seekers, immigrants, segregated minorities) will often
attempt to enter low-skilled labor positions (e.g. labor-intensive agriculture, mining, crude
manufacturing) that do not require intensive education. Citizens, inhabiting economically
precarious positions, may perceive that they are in competition for the same positions. In situations
where such niche overlap occurs, combined with high unemployment, social welfare policies
discriminating between ethnic groups (e.g. NRIS job training programs) have the potential to
exacerbate hostility and resentment.
Situations in which economic and political conditions fuel the resentment toward ethnic
minorities constitute a fertile ground for political entrepreneurs and populist movements. A good
example of that dynamic is provided by Marian Kotleba, the leader of the far-right populist
People's Party that has remained in power since 2013 in Banska Bystrica, a region of central
Slovakia where the per capita GDP is at 61% of the EU average (Eurostat, 2017). Kotleba’s
political rhetoric during campaigning relied on virulent criticisms of social welfare programs for
the ‘undeserving’ Roma minority (Kluknavska, 2015). According to the European Commission,
the Roma - Slovakia's largest ethnic minority - comprise 9.02 % of the total Slovak population.
Banska Bystrica represents a perfect example of an area economically lagging, while also
15

containing a substantial, largely segregated minority population. It has provided a fertile ground
for a political entrepreneur to emerge on the base of an exclusionary program (discussed further in
subsequent chapters).
The welfare state and multiculturalism
The implementation of multicultural policies in ethnically heterogeneous societies seems
to have contributed to the increase in resentment toward minorities, as well as a decrease of support
for the welfare state. A common feature unifying progressive political platforms is the support of
policies that increase multiculturalism, whether it is implemented through immigration strategies,
positive discrimination, or redistributive assistance programs. A growing body of literature has
been devoted to investigating the relationship between welfare states and multiculturalist policies
(Mau & Burkhardt, 2009; Senik et al. 2009; Tolsma et al. 2008, Banting & Kymlicka, 2003). This
research seems to indicate that implementing multicultural policies (e.g. redistribution on the base
of cultural identity and positive discrimination), in regions that are either ethnically heterogeneous
or have experienced recent immigration waves, can increase tensions among majority residents.
Scholars have called this tension the "progressive's dilemma" (Goodhart, 2004; Pearce, 2004).
Banting (2010) argues that multicultural policies increasing the visibility of diversity has
progressively eroded social solidarity in Europe. As majority populations begin to pull their
support for progressive policies, for diverse reasons such as the perceived cultural threat or the
fears responding to Islamic terrorist acts, political coalitions that once built the welfare state are
beginning to fragment (Banting, 2010). A generous welfare state could be incompatible with
multicultural policies, hence, the 'dilemma' (see Kymlicka & Banting, 2006).
Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) have shown that, in the United States, social
expenditures typically decline with increases in diversity. Diversity may be the reason why the
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United States has failed to establish the large-scale redistributive policies alike the ones in Europe
and Canada (Alesina et al., 2001). The United States spends approximately 15.1 percent of total
GDP on social programs yearly (as of 1995), compared to the European Union, which spent 25.4
percent of its GDP (Alesina et al., 2001). It should be noted, however, that the margin between the
EU and the United States has decreased in recent years. According to the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the United States increased social spending to
19.3 percent in 2016, while most EU member states have remained relatively stable.
According to the OECD, Sweden spent 30.6 percent of its total GDP on social programs
in 2016, making that country rank as one of the largest redistributive welfare states in the world
(OECD, 2017). Eger (2009), by analyzing survey responses assessing attitudes towards social
expenditures, has shown that, in Sweden, recent immigration waves, and subsequent increases in
ethnic heterogeneity negatively affected attitudes towards redistributive social welfare. Eger
(2009) also found negative attitudes to be stronger among those from low economic positions,
those with fewer educational attainments, and those with a greater history of receiving social
assistance. Sweden has shown a 3 percent decrease in social spending over the last ten years
(Office of Economic Coordination and Development, 2017). In analyzing time-series data
spanning from 1994 to 2010, Schmidt-Catran & Spies (2016) found that, in Germany, residents
showed a decline in support for welfare programs, as the foreign-born population increased at the
regional level. Aligning with what could be predicted from ethnic competition theory, SchmidtCatran & Spies (2016) also found this effect to be significantly stronger in regions with high
unemployment rates.
As shown in studies based on responses to social surveys (e.g. Eger, 2010; Schmidt-Catran
& Spies, 2016), individuals in economically precarious positions tend to decrease their support for
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welfare spending as the foreign-born population increases. However, these studies do not address
the specific economic niche occupied by individuals immigrating and thus lack a proper
explanatory model. Ethnic heterogeneity alone does not help explain decreases in support for
spending. Other features that explain the phenomena should include the specific economic niche
occupied by newcomers, or marginalized and ostracized minorities, coupled with redistributive
assistance programs to targeting specific groups. The combination provides political
entrepreneurs, seeking to exploit situations where niche overlap is occurring, with a fertile ground
to rally support.
Although the 'Progressive's Dilemma' appears to hold in Europe, Soroka, Johnston, Banting
(2004) have found that this effect - decreases in support for welfare spending when the foreignborn population is increased - doesn't necessarily hold in Canada. Although not as prolific a social
welfare spender compared with Europe, Canada still exceeds U.S. levels for social program
spending (Alesina et al. 2001). Interestingly, Canada is also quite ethnically heterogeneous, with
18 percent of its population being born outside of the country (Kymlicka & Banting, 2006). A
common assumption among scholars (e.g. Alesina et al. 2001, Alesina et al. 2003, Alesina et al.
2012) is that ethnic heterogeneity decreases interpersonal trust - a factor necessary for supporting
a large welfare state. Kymlicka & Banting (2006, ) have found that trust (measured through e.g.,
questions assessing respondents’ confidence in having a lost wallet returned) decreased in
Canadian neighborhoods that were more ethnically diverse, providing some support for the
assumption. However, with further investigation, Kymlicka & Banting (2006) found that, even
after controlling for income, support for welfare programs did not decline in the same, ethnically
diverse neighborhoods. Canada stands as an exception to the 'progressives' dilemma'.
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Euroscepticism
In regions where strong national identification is the norm, fears associated with European
integration provide an exploitable opportunity for political entrepreneurs. Although research has
focused on how national identity can suppress support for European integration, there is a dearth
of research that investigates whether accession to the EU and implementation of policies directed
towards specific groups might motivate and strengthen nationalistic expressions.
Individual assessments of the trustworthiness in political institutions are especially relevent
for the discussion and largely depend on the perception that institutions are performing their
intended function and that politicians are adequately representing the interests of the electorate
(Lenard, 2012). When politicians do not represent the interests of the electoral majority enough
(e.g. when politicians complying with supranational EU directives selectively allocate funding, in
short supply, to specific groups), trust in both politicians, and the institutions they represent, might
suffer. If politicians comply with EU obligations mandating them to develop economic assistance
programs for select categories of individuals, like the NRIS, residents occupying positions of
economic precarity might perceive such allocation as a direct threat to their interests, thus
undermining trust in such politicians. Politicians that attempt to fulfill certain EU obligations (e.g.
those parties that lead EU accession negotiations) could alienate a portion of the electorate. My
research investigates reactions to such political leadership (i.e. those representing mainstream
political parties, favorable to EU), and how they vary depending on the economic circumstances
associated to specific regions. It's expected that highly developed regions, which have incorporated
knowledge-based sectors that have benefitted from EU accession, will remain partial to
mainstream parties partial to Europeanization. It's also expected that these same parties will lose
considerable support among economically underdeveloped regions that, although benefitting
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slightly from EU accession, have not seen the same success experienced by more developed
regions.
Consensus among European citizens in favor of European integration has eroded in recent
decades (Krouwel & Abts, 2007). A body of research has investigated the negative relationship
between the process enlargement, the expanding influence of the European Union, and institutional
trust in member states (Hudson, 2006; McLaren, 2007; Abts et al. 2009; Arnold et al. 2012) The
decline of trust in the EU, and its progressive enlargement, has been termed "Euroscepticism".
Euroscepticism might be driven by citizens’ dissatisfaction with their respective national political
institutions (Gabel, 1998; McLaren, 2002). Krouwel & Abts (2007) have shown empirically that
Euroscepticism may be associated to a broader decline in trust in democratic institutions (both at
the national and supranational level), partially spurred by the increasing influence of populist
political entrepreneurs that successfully tap into various regional forms of political discontent.
Human, social and economic capitals play an essential role in moderating individuals’
opinion toward European integration (Marks & Hooghe, 2003). Those with a greater skill set,
better social networks and more resources have generally been better equipped for dealing with
market liberalization (Gabel, 1998). Indeed, individuals with economic ties to international
markets have greatly benefited from the removal of exchange barriers or the use of a common
currency that came with EU membership. Low-skilled workers have been faced with much greater
hurdles once integration in the competitive international market took place. Economic sectors
incorporating low-skilled labor (e.g. labor-intensive agriculture, crude manufacturing, mining)
have not been able to sustain competitiveness when faced with the open market forces associated
to economic liberalization and European integration (Swank & Betz, 2003). As will be seen in
Chapter 2, this dynamic has contributed to significant unemployment, often necessitating the need
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for countries (e.g. Hungary) to accept substantial external economic stimulus packages to prevent
economic collapse.
Economic precarity alone is insufficient as an explanation for why political discontent,
including harsh Euroscpeticism and extreme expressions populist sovereignism, emerges in
economically underdeveloped regions. Such regions did benefit slightly from EU accession
through economic assistance from EU regional development and social funds, but not close to the
extent that economically modernized regions, incorporating knowledge-based sectors, flourished.
As Nagel (1974) argues, high income inequality (as evidenced through GINI) is a significant factor
behind political discontent. Thus, a citizen's baseline assessment of their economic standing,
relative to others, should be a more significant motivator, in relation to precarity alone, behind
political discontent. As Nagel (1974) puts it, as a citizen "measures his lot against another's" the
relative disadvantage and dissatisfaction that can emerge spurs political discontent (Nagel, 1974,
p. 454). Research on the base-rate fallacy (as it relates to economic assessment) has also shown
that humans have an innate tendency to adjust the assessment of their relative economic standing
by ignoring base-rate information (i.e. previous economic condition) and focusing solely on
individuating information (i.e. current economic standing), rather than integrating both (Tversky
& Kahneman, 1981; Bar-Hillel, 2002). Thus, although citizens in underdeveloped regions may
have seen a slight increase in their economic standing after EU accession, they will likely ignore
information about their previous economic standing and focus solely on information regarding
their current standing, relative to those that have benefitted substantially in more developed
regions.
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Chapter 2
National Sovereignty

I. Introduction
The accession to the European Union comes with a partial relinquishment of national
autonomy. Member countries must adopt EU policy directives that curtail sovereignty to some
extent. This was seen especially with the refugee relocation scheme, implemented by the EU in
2015, which mandated that member states take in a specific number of refugees, proportionate to
their population, to relieve the burden on Greece and Italy, who received a disproportionately large
and unmanageable number of refugees (European Commission, 2018). Is relinquishing some
national autonomy by a state perceived as a threat by its citizens? If so, does the perceived threat
motivate nationalist movements? In the case of refugee relocation scheme, it does appear that the
EU's handling of the issue compounded frustrations with the EU and motivated the rhetoric of
populist political entrepreneurs (addressed below).
The 2015 large influx of asylum-seekers and refugees has put a strain both on the societies
of member states and the EU institutions (Carrera et al., 2015). To ensure the ‘sharing of the
responsibility,’ the European Union adopted a refugee relocation scheme that guaranties the
equitable redistribution of displaced people across member states (Baubock, 2018). The program
is enforceable in accordance with Article 63.1 of the Treaty of Nice that holds that EU member
countries are bound to protect the rights of refugees and asylum seekers. The policy was intended
to alleviate the burden placed on Italy and Greece, which, at the time, received approximately 80%
of the refugees moving to Europe (Baubock, 2018). Many political leaders, especially in Eastern
Europe, opposed the quota system since its inception (Baubock, 2018).
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At the height of the migration crisis, in 2015, both Hungary' and Slovakia’s European
Council representatives voted against the implementation of the refugee quota system, arguing that
their current institutions could not handle the increasing numbers of persons (Crisp & Day, 2010).
When Hungary openly opposed the refugee crisis by building border walls, the EU's migration
commissioner, Dimitris Avramopoulos, warned that if Hungary "[were to continue] to refuse to
accept refugees, it would be referred to the European Court of Justice for breaches of EU law",
which could have potentially resulted in large fines (Crisp & Day, 2010). In September of 2017,
Slovakia and Hungary challenged the EU’s compulsory migrant quota system in the European
Court of Justice. With regards to the quota system, Hungary’s foreign minister, Peter Szijjarto, the
leader and spokesman of Fidesz, a right-wing, populist political party, is quoted as having said in
a local news conference: "politics has raped European laws and values" (Crisp & Day, 2010).
Carrera et al. (2015) argued that the welcoming of refugees and their assimilation into the
labor force could increase GDP in member states by up to 0.2% per year. Previous migrant
assimilation programs have had limited success in Europe, however (see Cesari, 2009).
Unassimilated communities prone to extremism have sometimes emerged because of such
population movements (Cesari, 2009). In their 2015 study Lilly and Shapiro proposed that the
1,255,600 first-time asylum seekers applying for international protection across Europe in 2015
alone, would likely stretch the institutions in charge of sponsoring migrants’ integration into labor
forces and social structures (Lilly & Shapiro, 2015). Desiderio (2015) argues too that refugees’
integration requires "deep, up-front investments in […] education and labor market activities (in
an already tight fiscal context) for the benefit of people who, in the end, may be required to return
home". Funds that are used for the development of integration programs for refugees and asylum
seekers may be scarce resource for countries with lagging, underdeveloped economic regions. This
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opens the opportunity for populist political entrepreneurs to engage in a rhetoric that attacks the
EU for mandating integration and assistance programs and the subsequent loss in political
autonomy. Populist political entrepreneurs may argue that the funds should be used for helping
citizens in underdeveloped regions, rather than provided to those categorized as outsiders (i.e.
immigrants, asylum seekers, Roma minority).
Desidiero (2016) studied immigration across all OECD countries and notes that refugees’
labor qualifications belong primarily to low-skilled occupations and primary economic sectors,
such as agriculture, manufacturing, and the service industry. Employers in these fields of
occupations receive financial incentives from their national governments (e.g. Sweden, Germany)
and the EU, for hiring refugee workers (Lilly & Shapiro, 2015; OECD/UNHCR, 2018). The
European Social Fund and the Assylum Migration Immigration Fund (AMIF) both contain
instruments to provide funding to host countries to streamline refugees' access to their respective
labor markets (European Commission, 2018). Such schemes have the unintended consequence of
putting working class citizens of host countries at a disadvantage
In Sweden, the "100 club" program guarantees governmental wage subsidies for employers
who commit to hiring 100 refugees over the course of three years (OECD/UNHCR, 2018). The
Swedish government has experienced considerable political backlash for accepting a relatively
large influx of migrants (i.e. approximately 2 percent of the total population) and providing
advanced assistance to immigrants, rather than directing that portion of the budget to security
(Reuters Staff, 2016). In a similar vein, 82 percent of Hungarians agreed with the statement that
refugees were a burden because they took jobs and benefits from citizens (Reuters Staff, 2016). In
the 2018 Swedish parliamentary election, the Swedish Democrats, a right-wing nationalist party
led by Jimmie Akinson (who also served as the leader in various neo-Nazi movements), gained 29
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seats over the previous election of 2014 (Pollard & Ahlander, 2018). Sweden currently (as of 2018)
is grappling with a hung parliament as a result.
The EU’s control of aspects of member states’ policy elaboration could be linked to the
recent success of populist parties. Those parties typically promise to recover national sovereignty,
that is, to regain control over its governance, unburdened by supranational interference (Lilly &
Shapiro, 2015). Such parties depart from the mainstream European political consensus on
migration, trade, and affirmative action policies and special programs for minorities. Promoting a
populist sovereignist political agenda, those parties identify supranational actors and globalmarket agents as enemies, dismantling the institutions of the societies of the peoples that they
propose to defend, as well as limiting their capacity of self-determination (De Spiegeleire, Skinner,
& Sweijs, 2017).
Populist sovereignism advocates that the interests of the nation should be strictly
prioritized over foreign interests. The recent 2016 GOP campaign run by U.S. president Donald
Trump seems to have adopted such political message. The campaign slogan "America First" and
the promise to transfer power "from Washington D.C. to the American people" are good
illustrations of the tenor of the nationalist and populist messaging favored by populist sovereignist
parties (De Spiegeleire, Skinner, & Sweijs, 2017). The depiction of a parasitic elite from which
the power to govern should be wrestled away to be returned to the people figures prominently in
the political message of populist parties operating in Europe (Mudde, 2013).
In 2016, the United Kingdom held a referendum on exiting the European Union (Brexit),
resulting in a slim majority, 51.9 percent, expressing its wish to leave the EU (Freeden, 2017).
During the preparation for the referendum, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), a
Eurosceptic populist party, strongly advocated for an exit. One of the primary issues highlighted
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by UKIP was the compulsory refugee quota. Other issues raised were related to migrant access to
welfare, and border security (Vasilopolou, 2016). UKIP’s messaging seems to have responded to
a groundswell of discontent. Indeed, according to the 2015 wave of the Eurobarometer public
opinion poll, over 61 percent of British respondents claimed that immigration was the most
pressing issue currently facing the U.K. (Vasilopolou, 2016).
Vasilopolou (2016) analyzed public opinion surveys from the U.K.; specifically, responses
to the question "when negotiating Britain's relationship with the EU, in which of the following
areas do you think David Cameron should seek to change our relationship?" (p. 223). Among the
British respondents, 52 percent ranked "to regain greater control of borders and immigration from
the EU" as the most pressing issue, while 46 percent of respondents wanted to limit the state
benefits for which EU migrants qualify (Vasilopolou, 2016, p. 223). Additionally, 29 percent of
respondents wanted greater powers for their national parliament to block EU policies, which would
indicate that a significant proportion of the general public sought greater political autonomy
(Vasilopolou, 2016, p. 223). Here, it is important to note that, among the general public and the
rhetoric implemented by political entrepreneurs, it does not appear that a clear distinction is made
between immigrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers. Rather, it appears that they are broadly
categorized as outsiders and, in extreme cases of radicalized rhetoric, regarded as 'foreign invaders'
and a threat to the homogeneity and sovereignty of the respective host country (discussed further
in Ch. 3).
The EU's influence on the United Kingdom’s migration policy (as well as other issues, like
trade and labor mobility) provided a fertile ground for UKIP to agitate for the recovery of a greater
national sovereignty and, eventually, a European Union exit. Vasilopolou (2016) noted the
relevance of the socioeconomic status for the support of an EU exit. A greater affluence and a
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higher education level guaranteed a greater support for remaining in the Union (Vasilopolou,
2016). As Vasilopolou argues, individuals with higher levels of education and income " tend to
consider themselves ‘winners’ of globalization and are thus less likely to express dissatisfaction,
more likely to reap the economic benefits of European integration and less likely to feel threatened
by other cultures" (Vasilopolou, 2016, p. 224).
In theory, populist sovereignty does not constitute necessarily an authoritarian threat to
liberal democracy. These movements generally demand an increase in popular sovereignty and
public participation in democracy (De Spiegeleire, Skinner, & Sweijs, 2017). Mudde & Kaltwasser
(2012) argue that it could serve as a needed corrective against the possible corruption of liberal
democracy. However, when in power, populist sovereignist movements often contribute to the
erosion of the institutional pillars of liberal democracies (Mudde, 2007, p. 31). Such pillars include
the institutions (e.g. irremovable judiciary, electoral laws, regional parliamentary representation)
that maintain a proper system of checks and balances.
Corduwener (2014) analyzed party documents from the Freedom Party of Austria (FPO),
a far-right populist party, to determine which features of liberal democracies it adopted, and which
were rejected. The FPO attacks the legitimacy of the Austrian traditional parties by accusing them
of coordinating as members of a supranational political elite that would have stolen control over
decisional institutions. FPO’s political messaging often attempts to persuade its audience of the
systematic lack of neutrality of government institutions (Corduwener, 2014).
Italy's Five Star Movement (M5S), led by former comedian Beppe Grillo, stands as another
example of populist movement, which met considerable success in the 2013 Italian general
elections by adopting an anti-establishment stance. The party line presented a virulent opposition
to mainstream political figures and parties, which the Five Star Movement’s political rhetoric
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depicted as a cartel (Bordignon & Ceccarini, 2015). In the views of the M5S’ leadership,
inexperienced citizens would have done a better job than career politicians, the inexperience of the
former being considered a strong moral guarantee (Bordignon & Ceccarini, 2015). To fill the 163
parliamentary seats (i.e. Chamber of Deputies and Senate) it had won in the election, the M5S held
party-members-only online elections, in which ordinary citizens were selected as running
candidates. The incumbents had to be certified by Grillo himself. Grillo's inclusion criteria
specified that they could not have criminal convictions and they could not be members of other
mainstream parties (Bordignon & Ceccarini, 2013; Bordignon & Ceccarini, 2015). The party’s
objective was a parliament composed of 'ordinary people', with all economic strata represented
and an increase in women and youth representation (Russo, Tronconi, & Verzichelli, 2014). The
move has forced other mainstream parties, including the PD (Social Democrat Party), to follow
suite to remain competitive (Russo, Tronconi, & Verzichelli, 2014). The election of ordinary
citizens to MP positions, as a check to political careerism and its perceived natural consequence,
corruption, became much more frequent in Italian politics (Bordignon & Ceccarini, 2015).
A more troubling feature exhibited by the Italian Five Star Movement is the "strong man"
nature of its leader. Such authoritarian leaders maintain central control over decision making, reject
the delegation of power to other governing institutions, and occupy an antagonistic relationship
with other ‘competing’ agencies of the state (Dix, 1985) Beppe Grillo has consistently criticized
the complexity and intrusiveness of state bureaucracy, going as far as to justify publicly the act of
tax evasion (Bordignon & Ceccarini, 2015). As the party became more successful, many (including
party members) began to accuse Grillo of acting increasingly in an authoritarian fashion, exerting
much control over the movement’s strategic choices (Bordignon & Ceccarini, 2013).
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Populist sovereignist movements seem to achieve the most popularity in working-class
constituencies that face difficulties competing in an open labor market (Betz & Meret, 2012).
Populist parties’ leaders often link free-market institutions with a remote, globalist political elite
in an antithetical position to the interests of the working class (Mudde, 2007). The institutions and
policies supportive of a market economy are generally under attack from such movements, while
protectionist economic measures are proffered (Mudde, 2007). Trump followed a similar logic in
his 2016 campaign promoting an anti-globalization position, attacking global trade deals (e.g.
Transpacific Partnership, North American Free Trade Agreement) and promising additional tariffs
on imports.
As Rodrik (2017) notes, global trade causes economic frictions, among which, job
displacement for some groups. But trade is only one factor that impacts labor markets. Other
critical factors include demand shocks, domestic technological innovation, and ordinary
competition with other domestic firms (Rodrik, 2017). Why would populist movements
consistently attack foreign trade over other economic forces? Foreign trade is often presented as
tantamount to a foreign influence and a threat to national sovereignty, hence, attacking it may be
used to steer political constituencies to action, especially if those constituencies find themselves
in fragile economic conditions. Also, publicly criticizing foreign trade may constitute a strong
political signal as it taps into concerns about justice and fairness: ‘by playing an unfair game, they
are robbing us of what is ours.’
Starmans, Sheskin, & Bloom (2017) have observed in laboratory studies that humans
reliably prefer fair inequality over unfair equality. When in small groups, individuals typically
express preferences for equality. However, in acknowledging individual differences in merit (e.g.
work ethic, perseverance), general aptitudes, and moral integrity, people also recognize that an
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equal distribution could be inherently unfair, rewarding free-riders at the expense of those more
deserving (Rodrik, 2017). People don’t necessarily have a preference against unequal wealth
distributions, but rather, an aversion to perceived unfairness (e.g. exploitation of market
conditions). This finding extends as far back as the foundational work done by Kahneman, Knetch,
& Thaler (1986). Trade is particularly salient because it can be framed in terms of economic
unfairness. As Rodrik (2017) explains, "It's one thing to lose your job to someone who competes
under the same rules as you do. It's a different thing when you lose your job to someone who takes
advantage of lax labor, environmental, tax, or safety standards in other countries" (p. 15).
It's not uncommon for populist political entrepreneurs to attribute the lack of economic
success to international economic agents they depict as a globalist elite that thrives by evading
national constraints. Far-right populist parties, such as the Lega Nord in Italy, the Austrian
Freedom Party, and the French National Front, are highly critical of the financial power and
influence of large, international corporations and supranational political actors like the EU
(Zaslove, 2008). Italy's Lega Nord primarily represents a core constituency of working and lowermiddle class supporters in small townships in North-Eastern Italy (Beirich and Woods, 2000).
During its time in parliament, the Lega Nord intensified its attack on what it called domestic and
international political elites (Zaslove, 2008). Mainstream politicians, at the national level and
representing the European Union, were portrayed as corrupt careerists. Lega Nord also became
especially vocal in its support for trade barriers to protect local industries from the forces of the
global market. The party has criticized the EU for not implementing measures to protect Italian
products from external competition (Zaslove, 2008).
Across Europe, the growing representation of populist movements in national parliaments
appears to be constraining the policy proposals and rhetoric of more centrist political parties. In
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Denmark, the Danish People's Party, a right-wing populist movement, has seen considerable recent
success, obtaining 12.3 percent of the parliamentary vote in 2011, and jumping to 21.2 percent in
2015 (Judis, 2016, p. 132). The Danish People's Party has campaigned on a Eurosceptic platform,
calling for the bolstering of border controls and restrictions on immigration. Because of its success,
the Danish Peoples Party was capable of providing informal support to the Liberal Alliance,
blocking the Social Democrats from forming a government in 2015. In exchange for their informal
support, the Liberal alliance adopted many of the Danish Peoples Party’s favored policies (Judis,
2016, p. 133). Those policies included cutting refugee and immigrant benefits by up to 45 percent,
and compelling schools to introduce pork in their lunch menus in defiance to Islamic religious
requirements (Judis, 2016, p. 133).
Populist parties with nativist tendencies have increased their influence, resulting in a loss
of seat-share among mainstream parties unwilling to shift from the center-left or center-right
(Galston, 2018). In 2006, the Czech Social Democrats, categorized as ideologically center-left,
garnered almost one third of the seats (i.e. 70 seats, 30.2% parliamentary total) of the national
parliament. In the 2017 Czech parliamentary elections, the party plummeted to only 15 seats, or
7.3% of the total seats in parliament. Indeed, social democrats have lost shares of the electoral
votes in all countries that have seen the strong resurgence of sovereignist populists, including the
Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Austria, and France (Karnitschnig, 2015). Over the last two
decades, populist sovereignist parties have increasingly garnered electoral support with
approximately 10 % of the parliamentary vote in over half of the countries in Western Europe
(Swank & Betz, 2002). In the next sections I focus specifically on study cases from Eastern
Europe.
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II. Slovakia
When the European Union proposed its compulsory migrant quota scheme in 2015,
Slovakia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Romania opposed the implementation of the policy in
a vote at the European Council. Playing on fears that the refugee's presented a threat to security
and national sovereignty, during the 2015 refugee crisis the Slovak government refused to accept
refugees and initiated the building of border walls in violation of Article 78(3) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which stipulates that "in the event of one or more
Member States being confronted by an emergency situation characterized by a sudden inflow of
nationals of third countries, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting
the European Parliament, may adopt provisional measures for the benefit of the Member State(s)
concerned" (European Commission, 2015). Furthermore, when Slovakia agreed to accept 200
refugees from Syria, they did so with the stipulation that they had to be Christians (Park, 2015,
Jancarikova, 2016). Can these actions be linked to a broader push for national sovereignty? If so,
who are the political entrepreneurs promoting such a political agenda?
Many Slovak political leaders have argued against accepting refugees, with in mind the
threat to the Slovak national identity, the risk of spread of Islam in Europe, and the potential of
creating pockets of unassimilated Muslim communities (Cuprik, 2017). According to the Office
of Economic Coordination and Development (OECD), of the 35 most highly developed countries
in the world, Slovakia (ranked 27th for GDP per capita) ranks last in terms of the numbers of
refugees they've accepted. Justifying Slovakia's stance on the refugee question, Anton Hrnko, the
Deputy Chairman of the Slovak National Party (a self-described nationalist political party
espousing Christian values), linked the crisis to the expansion of Islam and its threat to Slovak
culture (Cuprik, 2017). Referencing Muslims, Hrnko wrote on his Facebook page that “For over
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150 years we had them at the borders, and we know how much blood and sweat it took to send
them back to where they came from” (Cuprik, 2017). In January of 2016, Prime Minister Robert
Fico defended Slovakia’s slow admission of asylum seekers, claiming that it was necessary for the
country to "prevent the creation of a compact Muslim community in Slovakia" (Cuprik, 2017).
Around the same time, Direction (Smer) - Social Democracy (the party in which Robert Fico
leads), purchased billboards across Slovakia which read: "We Are Protecting Slovakia" (Hlavac,
2016).
In October of 2017, representatives from Slovakia and Hungary challenged the legality of
the migrant quota scheme in the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In a press briefing on the matter,
Laszlo Trocsanyi, Hungary's Justice Minister, stated that, among other reasons, the admission of
refugees "was an issue of national sovereignty" (Linos, Jakli, & Carlson, 2017). After hearing
arguments by representatives from both countries, the ECJ decided to uphold the policy (i.e.
migration quota scheme) on the grounds of Article 78(3) of the Lisbon Treaty and the TFEU,
which stipulates that "in the event of one or more Member States being confronted by an
emergency situation characterized by a sudden inflow of nationals of third countries, the Council,
on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt provisional measures for the benefit of the Member
State(s) concerned. It shall act after consulting the European Parliament" (European Commission,
2015). The refugee quota was adopted by the EU because Greece and Italy took in a
disproportionately large and unmanageable number of refugees, which the EU regarded as an
emergency situation. Regarding the ruling, Hungary's foreign minister Peter Sziijarto quoted in a
news conference that "the Hungarian government considers today's decision by the European court
to be appalling and irresponsible" (Crisp & Day, 2017).
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The Slovak National Party (SNS) is right-wing populist party that has seen considerable
success over the last century. The SNS has adopted a platform oriented specifically towards
ethnic Slovaks, has remained highly skeptical of European integration and, at times, has
promoted strong xenophobic sentiments (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002; Deegan-Krause &
Haughton, 2009). In 2006, the SNS was the junior partner (i.e. winning 11.73 % of the
parliamentary seats) in a coalition with leader Robert Fico, representing the Direction (Smer) Social Democracy party. At that point, the SNS occupied a relatively radical, xenophobic
position in the coalition, which heavily scapegoated Slovakia's Roma minority, as well as the
Hungarian (Magyar) minority (Milo, 2005, pp. 213-214; Jancarikova, 2016).
In the 2012 parliamentary election, the SNS suffered a severe dip in electoral support,
winning no parliamentary seats, while Robert Fico and Smer-SD held parliamentary majority.
Andrej Danko, the leader of the SNS, adopted a more moderate platform after their loss in 2012,
advocating for tax cuts for small businesses and immigration reforms (Jancarikova, 2016).
However, the refugee crisis in 2015 seems to have reinvigorated the more radical stance previously
held by the SNS. In the 2016 parliamentary election, the party campaigned on a platform that
depicted the refugee crisis as a severe threat to border security and national sovereignty. Regarding
migrants, Andrej Danko is quoted as having said in a news interview that “migrants disrupt the
EU’s administrative system and pose a security threat. It does not matter that they are unarmed; it
is a mass incursion” (Jancarikova, 2016). In the vein of nationalist sovereignty, the SNS party has
also placed emphasis on supporting features associated to the Slovak culture, including its
Christian past. Andrej Danko has mentioned publicly that the party intended to increase public
funding for Christian churches (Jancarikova, 2016). Finally, SNS promised in their campaign to
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address regional economic disparities, and to increase the regional development of the east through
targeted stimuli and subsidies (Hlavac, 2016).
In the 2016 parliamentary election, Direction (Smer) - Social Democracy, led by Robert
Fico, still captured the most seats (i.e. 83 seats, 44.4 % total), but lost its majority position. Perhaps
riding on a migration-fueled popular discontent, more radical right-wing parties saw a resurgence
in support in 2016. The SNS, led by Andrej Danko, gained 15 seats (i.e. 8.6 % total), an important
increase from 0 seats in 2012. Meanwhile, Kotleba - People's Party Our Slovakia (L’SNS), a
radical right-wing party defending extreme nativist positions (discussed further in Chapter 3), saw
considerable success, securing 14 seats, or 8% of the seat share, the first time the party obtained
parliamentary representation. Parties that were previously a mainstay in Slovak politics, like the
Slovak Democratic and Christian Union—Democratic Party (SDKÚ-DS), which led the promarket economic reforms of the early 2000's, suffered a severe decline (SDKÚ-DS only received
0.3% of the votes) (Hlavac, 2016). When Robert Fico was invited by Slovak President Andrej
Kiska to engage in government formation talks, a wave of anti-fascist protests ensued in Bratislava,
Slovakia's most economically prosperous region (The Slovak Spectator, 2016). All parties that
secured a parliamentary seat, with the exception of We Are Family (a newly-formed populist party
campaigning on preventing government corruption), refused to engage in government formation
talks with L'SNS (The Slovak Spectator, 2016).
Economic Trajectory/ Regional Analyses
Slovakia's transition from a centrally-planned economy to a market economy experienced
a tumultuous start. Prior to joining the EU in 2004, Slovakia experienced a stagnant economy
largely due to structural deficiencies in its Government (Marcincin & Bevlavy, 2000). According
to an OECD study (1993), the government that emerged from the 1992 parliamentary elections
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sought to slow the pace of economic reform, targeting privatization (Marcincin & Bevlavy, 2000).
That government, led by president Vladimir Meclar of The People's Party - Movement for a
Democratic Slovakia, commanded a strong minority presence with 74 out of 150 seats. This party
was also joined in 1993 by the Slovak National Party to form a strong majority coalition. The
coalition largely favored protectionist economic measures that would distance the state from the
more open policies set forth by the Czech Republic. These efforts initially crippled economic
growth throughout Slovakia. According to Marcincin & Bevlavy (2000), economic restrictions led
the general population to lose trust in its government. The cabinet led by president Meclar was
subsequently ousted by a vote of no confidence in 1994.
Although much of the public attributed post-transition economic decline to policy makers,
a study by the World Bank (1995) did find that macroeconomic instability was largely the result
of state formation and the establishment of new legal institutions. By the mid to late 90's, Slovakia's
decision-making sector determined that it needed to aggressively address the consequences of
foreign policy failures (Marcincin & Beblavy, 2000). In 1994, Slovakia's economy experienced a
revitalization. Okali et al. (1995) argue that economic growth in the mid 90's was largely
influenced by (a) restrictive fiscal and neutral monetary policies, (b) policies that improved export
and foreign trade balances, and (c) a natural end to the recession that emerged after splitting from
the Czech Republic. In general, it could be argued that the economic policies that were adopted
favored growth over the development of a sound institutional framework (Marcincin & Beblavy,
2000).
Slovakia's economic development intensified in the mid 90's, with GDP growth of 6.9% in
1995, an inflation rate of 7.2%, and an active trade balance (Kallaste et al., 1995). Unemployment
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also hovered around 11 to 13 percent during this period (Kallaste et al., 1995). According to
Marcincin & Bevlavy (2000) demand quickly exceeded GDP growth, leading to a trade imbalance.
In the later part of the 90's (problem in the sequence as you go back to 1995 afterward for
the application to EU), as Slovakia's economy began to stabilize, politicians began to set their
sights on joining the European Union. On June 27th, 1995, Vladimir Meclar (the leader of
numerous coalition governments during the 90's) submitted to the European Council the Slovak
Republic’s application to join the EU. The move would streamline economic coordination with
the European market, with economic gains stemming from increased trade and foreign investment.
To gain these benefits, however, Slovakia would need to adhere to the European Union's human
rights conditions, achieve a sufficient level of institutional stability, and be able to withstand the
competitive pressures that come with the opening to the EU market. According to Marcincin &
Bevlavy (2000), initial negotiation attempts faltered because Slovakia's institutions were perceived
by the EU lawmakers as inadequate and unreliable.
East/ West disparity
Slovakia currently ranks 6th, among all OECD countries, for regional economic disparities.
Bratislava, located in Western Slovakia, just east of Vienna, Austria, has a thriving economy.
Meanwhile, to the east, both Presov and Kosice offer examples of regions with high
unemployment, low-skilled labor and stagnant economic growth (Demmou, Halus, Machlica, &
Menkyna, 2015). According to Eurostat, in 2013 Bratislava kraj (region) had a GDP per capita of
€43,000, while Vychodne Slovensko (i.e. eastern Slovakia) had a GDP per capita of €12,100
(Demmou, Halus, Machlica, & Menkyna, 2015).
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Figure 1: Growth in regional GDP (per capita) in Slovakia, over the years of 1995 to 2010.
From: Matlovicova, K., Gavalova, A., & Kolesarova, J. (2014).

Figure 1 (above) shows how regional economic disparities, as measured through GDP per
capita, emerged over the period from 1995 to 2010 (Matlovicova, K., Gavalova, A., & Kolesarova,
J., 2014). Economic conditions in eastern and central Slovakia seem to have remained stagnant,
built primarily on an industrial and agricultural foundation (Habánik, Kordoš, & Hošták, 2016).
Regions in the east suffer from the lack of a modern transport infrastructure and limited investment
in local industry. A recent European report assessed the number of firms per 1,000 inhabitants and
found that Vychodne Slovensko (including Kosice and Presov in the east) contained 25 firms per
1,000 inhabitants; the average for Slovakia is 39 (European Commission, 2018). Additionally,
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Vychodne Slovensko is only attracting 7.4 percent of the total foreign direct investment in Slovakia
(European Commission, 2018).
The economy in Western Slovakia, however, has largely benefited from the entry in the
European market, which started shortly after the communist revolution in 1989 and intensified
after the EU accession (Korec & Ondoš, 2009). Specifically, the region of Západné Slovensko (in
which the capital of Bratislava is located) has attracted considerable direct foreign investment with
the development of high-tech manufacturing. From 1990 to 2012, the region consistently attracted
approximately 14 percent of Slovakia's total foreign investment, stemming primarily from the
manufacture of automobiles (e.g. Peugeot, Volkswagen) and consumer electronics (European
Commission, 2018). Metropolitan regions (e.g. Bratislava, Trencin) are also benefitting
significantly more than rural localities in the west, in terms of wages, infrastructure, and housing
development (European Commission, 2018). Many citizens from rural localities in the west, as
well as regions in the east, will attempt to find seasonal manufacturing work in the major
metropolitan regions, especially Bratislava (Korec & Ondoš, 2009).
Economic disparities between the economically modernized Bratislava and lagging regions
to the east is evidenced through an analysis of Slovakia's GINI coefficient, and how this changed
in relation to EU accession. In 1992, during the initial transition from a centrally planned Sovietstyle economy, to a liberalized economic market, Slovakia's GINI coefficient was at its lowest, at
19.5 points (OECD, 2018). Directly prior, and during accession to the European Union, Slovakia's
GINI coefficient was relatively stable at approximately 27 points (OECD, 2018). This increase can
be contributed to processes associated to economic liberalization. By 2005, and directly after EU
accession, Slovakia saw a sharp spike in GINI, to 29.3 points (OECD, 2018). GINI would continue
to fluctuate after 2005.
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The Attraction of Populist Sovereignism
In line with the theoretical literature on ethnic competition, as well as the effect exerted by
economic precarity, populist political movements should be more appealing to those residing in
eastern Slovakia, where more people live in precarious economic conditions. The 2016
parliamentary elections, which saw a marked shift to the right, is enlightening to that effect. Many
new (primarily populist) parties emerged, contributing to the most diverse parliament since the
communist revolution (Hlavac, 2016).
Bratislava, Slovakia's most prosperous region in the west, has benefitted considerably from
the open European market. Parties that received their highest vote percentages in Bratislava (e.g.
SaS, OLaNO) seemed to have directed their campaign at university-educated individuals and highskilled professionals (Hlavac, 2016). Slovakia's Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) party received their
highest vote percentage from Bratislava. SaS was founded, and is still led, by the businessman and
economist Peter Sulik, who served as the minister of finance for multiple Slovak governments and
has been credited with helping Slovakia to attract considerable foreign investments (Jancarikova,
2016). The party has been described as libertarian. It has announced in its 2012 manifesto that
individual freedom and responsibility were among their core principles (Hlavac, 2016, Institute
for European Policy, 2016). In their 2012 manifesto, the party also acknowledged that the current
condition of Roma minorities is a social problem in need of a solution, and that relations between
Slovaks and the Hungarian (Magyar) minority should be strengthened (Institute for European
Policy, 2016). SaS has also detailed the importance of European integration but has stressed that
even deeper supranational influence could threaten national sovereignty (Institute for European
Policy, 2016). SaS faired especially poorly in low-income, high unemployment regions such as
Nitra and Presov (Hlavac, 2016).
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The case for L'SNS (Marian Kotleba's radical, right-wing populist movement), in the 2016
parliamentary election, is quite different from that of SaS. Considering their radical discourse
against immigration, minorities, and free-trade, it could be expected that L'SNS would not fare
especially well with highly educated, economically prosperous populations, as would be predicted
through ethnic competition theory (e.g. Banton, 1983; Olzak, 1996; Banting & Kymlicka, 2006).
L'SNS saw its lowest level of support in Bratislava, garnering only 4.72 percent of the vote. In
Banska Bystrica, the district in which Marian Kotleba, the party's leader, is currently mayor, the
party managed to win 10.46 percent of the vote. In Presov and Zilina, districts that have lagged
economically and do not have a significant Hungarian minority, L'SNS saw comparable levels of
support (Hlavac, 2016).
Hlavac (2016) performed a regression analysis on regional-level data from the Statistical
Office of the Slovak Republic, to determine which demographic features (e.g. age, ethnicity,
employment, educational level) influenced each party’s ability to garner vote percentage in the
2016 parliamentary election. Education level was a significant determinant for almost all the
parties assessed. A negative association with education level (i.e. p < 0.01 level) can be observed
for parties that appealed to populist sovereignty, including L'SNS (at -0.159) and SNS (at -.222).
In the case of SaS, which espoused free-market libertarian ideals and supported the European
Union, there was a robust positive association (i.e. p < 0.01 level) of 0.758 (Hlavac, 2016).
Unemployment has a similar effect to education level on voting behavior. Right-wing
populist parties had a strong appeal in regions with a high unemployment rate. We find a positive
association at the p < 0.01 level between unemployment rate and voting for L'SNS, at 0.195
(Hlavac, 2016). The nationalist political party SNS also experienced significant support in high
unemployment regions, with a positive association of 0.128 at the p < 0.01 level. SaS saw its
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lowest levels of support in regions with a high unemployment rate with a strong negative
correlation of - 0.241 at the p < 0.01 level (Hlavac, 2016).
Hlavac (2016) also incorporated regional percentages of both Roma and Hungarian
minorities in the regression model. Support (i.e. vote share percentage) for populist parties
exhibiting nationalistic tendencies (e.g. SNS, L'SNS) yielded statistically significant results in
regions with large Roma and Hungarian populations. However, the relationship is negative in both
cases. The possibility that populist parties may do well by exploiting regional tensions between
ethnic Slovaks and minorities is not borne out in the regression results. Hlavac (2016) explains
that self-report survey data, where Hungarians and Roma can freely check off "Slovak", is
notoriously unreliable. L'SNS, whose leader (i.e. Marian Kotleba) has organized neo-Nazi marches
through Roma villages (detailed in Chapter 3), showed a moderate (at the p < 0.1 level) negative
association of - 0.255 (Hlavac, 2016). In regions with a considerable ethnic Hungarian population,
L'SNS also fared poorly, with a robust (at the p < 0.01 level) negative association of – 0.122.
Regions with high Roma and Magyar populations seemed to vote for the Ordinary People and
Independent Personalities party (henceforth OL'aNO). OL'aNO was formed in 2011 and, founded
on similar pro-EU ideals with Christian, social conservative leanings, has worked in a cooperative
alliance with SaS since its inception (Rybar & Spac, 2017). Like SaS, OL'aNO also appears to
have appealed to those highly skilled, highly educated citizens inhabiting the Bratislava region
(Hlavac, 2016).
Unlike the Roma, the ethnic Hungarians have significant political representation in the
Slovak parliament (Gurcsik & Satterwhite, 1996). Ethnic Hungarians primarily inhabit towns
along the southern border between Slovakia and Hungary and compose approximately 9 percent
of the total Slovak population. The ethnic Hungarian (Magyar) population has repeatedly been
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singled-out by nationalistic populist movements (discussed in Chapter 3) that frame them as a
threat to Slovak national identity because of a perceived inability to assimilate (Gurcsik &
Satterwhite, 1996).
In the 2016 parliamentary election, Most-Hid secured 11 seats in parliament and, with
center to center-right political leanings, was included in the coalition government with Smer-SD
and SNS. In the regression analyses performed by Hlavac (2016), Most-Hid did especially well
in regions with a high ethnic Hungarian (Magyar) population, with a robust (i.e. p < 0.001 level)
positive association of 0.444. Most-Hid also fared well in highly educated regions, like those in
western Slovakia, with a robust (i.e. p < 0.001 level) positive association of 0.272 (Hlavac,
2016).
The analysis of the framing and highlighting of chosen issues by sovereignist populist
parties' sheds light on their attraction for certain categories of voters. Kluknavska (2014)
conducted her analysis by focusing on various colletive action frames, where the blame for
perceived social problems (e.g. unemployment, perceived disintigration of national culture,
perceived unfettered immigration) is attributed to individuals (e.g. mainstream politicians) and
groups (e.g. minorities, elitist technocrats) (pp. 3-4). Specific focus was placed on how L'SNS
systematically describes the categories of individuals it considers its enemies, including Roma,
Immigrants, Political Elite, Media, Mainstream Parties, Affirmative Action Programs, over the
course of 2010 to 2013 (Kluknavska, 2014).
To quantify the framing methods implemented by L'SNS, Kluknavska (2014) identified
in a pilot study the diagnostic frames frequently drawn upon in their political rhetoric as well as
the solutions to those perceived problems. The set of features associated to each prognostic
frame were also defined. Kluknavska (2014) ran a final content analysis using information on the
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People Party our Slovakia’s website, and of their numerous published manifestos and articles
(contributing to a sample of 543 total diagnostic frames). Information that fit the typical set of
features associated to a specific diagnostic frame, as well as prognosis, were coded as such.
When attributing blame for the hardships (e.g. unemployment, low income, debt) faced
by their constituents (a "diagnostic"), L'SNS most commonly identifies the political elite,
involved in mainstream parties and engaging with the EU, as responsible. This strategy
comprised 54.4 percent of the total rhetoric coded, from 2010 to 2013 (Kluknavska, 2014). The
Roma, Roma-specific government programs (e.g. child subsidies, housing), and Roma
criminality, were criticized in 28.4 percent of the total rhetoric coded (Kluknavska, 2014). To a
much lesser extent, L'SNS’ messaging also incorporated criticisms of the economic and cultural
elite (e.g. financial firms, academics), as well as foreigners, including immigrants, the EU,
NATO, and supranational financial groups (Kluknavska, 2014).
Klunavska (2014) further analyzed how the diagnostic frames implemented by L'SNS
shifted temporally, including before and after the 2012 parliamentary elections. While
campaigning for the 2012 parliamentary election, it appears that L'SNS intensified its rhetoric
against the Roma, who they regularly described as "drunken, asocial Gypsy parasites"
(Klunavska, 2014). L'SNS also intensified its criticism of positive discrimination programs.
Rom-specific programs (e.g. specialized education, job placement) were adopted around 2011 to
comply with the European Union’s National Roma Integration Strategy (NRIS) framework
(European Commission, COM (2011) 173 final). Previously, in 2005, however, the Slovak
Constitutional Court had already ruled against such positive discrimination programs that would
be based on ethnicity and not socioeconomic status, claiming that any such programs were
unconstitutional (Goldirova, 2005).
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L'SNS faired especially poorly in the 2012 Slovak parliamentary elections, failing to
secure any parliamentary seats. Judging by the diagnostic frame analysis performed by
Kluknavska (2014), it appears that L'SNS changed its strategy after the loss, focusing less on
criticizing Roma assistance programs and shifting its focus on national sovereignty, in an antiglobalization vein. Specifically, rhetorical frames that insisted on a perceived loss of
independence to the benefit of supranational institutions and the abuse of power by a globalist
political elite, appear to have been intensified. According to Kluknavska (2014), the perceived
globalist political elite (i.e. primarily EU politicians and mainstream political parties), was often
criticized as "thieves, liars, and crooks" who "have plundered the state's assets", "destroyed
Slovakia" and "live in luxury" (Kluknavska, 2014, p. 12).
III. Poland
Prior to 2001, parties exhibiting tendencies associated to populist sovereignism (e.g.
emphasis on common history, criticism of a parasitic political elite, complaints over a loss of
autonomy at the hand of supranational institutions) were not central in Polish politics (Pankowski,
2010; Jasiewicz, 2008). According to Pankowski (2010, pp. 95-97), political entrepreneurs first
began to gain traction by drawing upon cultural resources around the early 2000's, most noteably
through the popular Catholic brodcasting channel Radio Maryja. Various small, extreme-right
movements used the media outlet to rally support and dissemenate information related to
conservative issues (e.g. abortion, gay rights) that were being debated in association with
navigating accession to the European Union (Pankowski, 2010). In 2001, Radio Maryja sponsored
its own populist, conservative electoral bloc known as the League of Polish Families (henceforth
referred to as LPR), which has remained active, with varying levels of pariamentary seat share, up
to 2018 (Markowski & Tucker, 2010).
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Talks of European Union accession, which followed shortly after Poland formed its
democracy following the communist revolution, appears to have reinvigorated a push for
"Polishness", by nationalistic poulist movements, including LPR (De Lange & Guerra, 2009). De
Lange & Guerra (2009) quote Bucker (2007, p. 123), who noted that "The EU is one external factor
that fosters the proliferation of protective nationalism among certain segments of its member
states’ populations, and this development might indeed be more salient in the new, Eastern
European member states than in the old ones, simply because the EU has been much more visible
in the new member states since the breakdown of socialism". After first applying for membership
in 1994, Poland completed accession negotiations with the European Union in 2002, in which the
proper transposition of laws compliant with the EU acquis was negotiated. In May of 2004, Poland
was included in the 2004 EU expansion, which also included Slovakia and Hungary (among
others). It appears that popular discontent over the EU negotiations, and subseqent accession, may
have provided populist parties, like LPR, with sufficient support to see an increase in poplarity for
the 2001 Sejm (Poland's lower house of their bicameral government) and 2004 European
Parliament elections (Markowski & Tucker, 2010).
By 2001, imminent accession into the European provided LPR with a sufficient base to see
its first electoral success in Poland's Sjem. As De Lange & Guerra (2009) note, LPR framed
themselves as the only true protectors of Polish values, which seems to have resonated with a
Catholic-nationalist constituency averse to Europeanization. This framing strategy was credible
because other right-leaning parties, representing rural, conservative interests (e.g. Polish Peasnat
Party, Law and Justice), were bound to a coalition agreement with the Euro-positive, center-left
Democratic Left Alliance-Labor Union (henceforth referred to as SLD-UP), thus unable to fight
against integration. By the 2004 European Parliemantary elections, held in June of 2004 (directly
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after Poland's accession was accepted in the May 2004 expansion), LPR succeeded in sending 10
representatives to the European Parliament, at almost 16 percent of the vote (De Lange & Guerra,
2009). The SLD-UP, which held a majority in the government at the time and guided Poland into
the EU, secured less than 10 percent of the vote, inciting fears among EU lawmakers of a potential
eurosceptic, populist backlash in Poland (De Lange & Guerra, 2009; Gaisbauer, 2007).
Since accessions negotiations started, it appears that euroscepticism has increased among
a considerable proportion of Polish citizens, allowing populist parties (e.g. League of Polish
Families, Self Defense for the Republic of Poland), claiming to fight for national sovereignism, to
gain considerable vote share. As Markowski & Tucker (2010) argue, the Polish party system in
the early 2000's was comprised of many new parties, all proposing different methods for fighting
unemployment. Given the economic niche occupied by many Poles, which may be threatened by
competition from open market forces, parties that proposed the potential of fixing the economy by
protecting Poland from a corrupt, supranational political elite, gained traction.
By the 2005 parliamentary elections, LPR was unable to maintain strong support, as other,
more centrist parties, adopted a eurosceptic ideological position to maintain a competitive edge
(Gaisbauer, 2007). Gaisbauer (2007) depicts Polish party positions, in the ideological space
associated to European integration, and how they changed in response to party competition, from
2001 to 2005. For their sustained insistence to reject EU accession, Gaisbauer (2007) placed LPR
solely in the position of an unchanging euroreject party. The Civic Platform, a mainstream liberalconservative, Christian Democrat party, appears to have started as strongly Euro-positive around
the time of the EU negotiations, only to shift to a moderate Eurosceptic position, by 2005, in
response to the growing popularity of populist movements. To distance themselves from the Civic
Platform, right-wing populist parties, representing rural, conservative interests (e.g. Polish Peasant
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Party, Law and Justice), shifted from an ideological stance only moderately Eurosceptic, to
extreme Euroscpeticism (Gaisbauer, 2007). Mainstream parties common throughout Europe (e.g.
Social Democrats) maintained their ideological position in full support of European integration.
During campaiging for the 2005 presidential and parliamentary election, the far-right,
populist Law and Justice (PiS) party unleashed a brutal attack against the governing Civic Platform
party and then president Donald Tusk (Pienkos, 2006). Among the issues highlighted was a virilent
criticism of the Civic Platform's leading role in the EU negotiations. Like with the rise of LPR in
the early 2000's, the influential Radio Maryja appears to have played a critical role in helping the
PiS party succeed over the Civic Platform. Presidential candidate, and the founder and chairman
of the Law and Justice Party, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, beat Donald Tusk by approximately 10 percent,
winning 54.47 percent of the vote.
It appears that Law and Justice's message, which included an economic stance closely
associated to the Labor movement (policies detailed in depth below), conservative-christian ideals,
and staunch euroscepticism, resonated with citizens in low income, rural regions, with agrarian
interests (Pienkos, 2006; Jasiewicz, 2008). Kaczynsi did especially well in Poland's southeastern
regions, among which several rank as the poorest regions in the country with alarming
unemployment rates (detailed further below) (Pienkos, 2006). The Civic Platform, a ChristianDemocrat party with conservative-liberal economic leanings, thus pushing for the opening of
Poland to the greater European free market, fared differently (Pankowski, 2010; Bakke & Sitter,
2005). Donald Tusk did well in more economically prosperous regions located in the western and
northern half of the country (Pienkos, 2006).
Prior to the massive refugee wave, from Syria and other parts of the middle east and north
Africa in 2015, immigration, in any form, was never a central issue in Polish politics
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(Krzyznowski, 2018). However, since the latter half of 2015, it appears that contention over
accepting refugees, as mandated by the European Union, has shifted the landscape of Polish
politics. Recent changes have allowed for far-right populist parties (e.g. Law and Justice, League
of Polish Families, National Movement) to levy for more power, whilst forcing mainstream parties
(e.g. Polish Christian Democratic Party, Civic Platform) to shift further towards right-wing
populism to retain votes (Pedziwiatr, 2016). When the European Union first enacted the migrant
quota scheme, to handle the massive 2015 influx that disproportionately burdened Italy and
Greece, Poland refused to accept their refugee allocation. The current Polish Prime Minister (as of
2018) and leader of the Law and Justice Party (henceforth referred to as PiS), Mateusz Morawiecki,
stated publicly that “proposals by the European Union that impose quotas on us hit the very
foundations of national sovereignty”, and that "here in Poland, it’s we (emphasis added) who
decide who will come to Poland and who will not" (Gavin, 2018). Commenting on the
government's intentions regarding the crisis, prime minister Morawiecki also told Radio Poland
that "We are invariably of the opinion, formulated by Law and Justice ahead of the elections of
2015, that we will not be receiving migrants from the Middle East and Northern Africa in Poland"
(Euronews, 2018).
After Poland failed to respond to multiple written warnings from the European
Commission, in 2017 the commission decided to proceed with infringement litigation with the
European Court of Justice, effectively suing Poland for failing to comply with the migrant quota
scheme. Representatives from the European Commission told reporters that they were moving
forward with the litigation against Poland for "non-compliance with their legal obligations on
relocation" (BBC, 2017).
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According to Krzyzanowski (2018), the PiS party was one of the leading far-right populist
parties behind an increase in radicalized rhetoric following the 2015 refugee crisis, which appears
to have been done to garner votes in the 2015 parliamentary election. PiS's rhetoric followed the
template of typical features associated to populist sovereignism (e.g. Euroscepticism, criticism of
supranational institutions, emphasis on a "common history"), while also veering quite radical,
including anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, and talks of dismantling laws associated to liberal
governments of the past (e.g. abortion). PiS has used multiple media outlets to disseminate such
populist rhetoric, including Facebook, Twitter, manifestos published on their party website, and
public speeches. Krzyznowski (2018) quantified Twitter rhetoric at the macro-level of frame
analysis, where any rhetoric (e.g. anti-immigration, Islamic threat, racist or discriminatory
remarks), which departed from the traditional political discourse in Poland. From Krzyznowski's
(2018) analysis, it can be concluded that framing tactics were changed (e.g. loss of autonomy
because of the EU - to - threat from radical Islam) in response to changing campaign dynamics
(e.g. media coverage, attacks by opponents).
In Poland, it appears that political discontent with the European Union and the refugee
quota, coupled with economic factors (e.g. unemployment, low income, inability of small
businesses to compete with the global market), has provided fertile ground not only for PiS, but
other, even more radical nationalistic parties to gain traction (e.g. Kukiz'15, Jobbik). In a country
with unconsolidated system of political parties, where new parties are continuously sprouting and
finding enough support to win considerable seat share, the prospect of an extremist party gaining
majority control is a very real possibility (Kolarska-Bobinska, 2003). Even more troubling is the
revolving nature of Poland's institutions, where, in 2001 alone, out of the 150 measures approved
by parliament, 80 of which were constitutional ammendments (Kolarska-Bobinska, 2003).
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Although much of these 2001 ammendments can be attributed to EU complaince and accession,
the relative ease at which new constitutional ammendments are introduced can potentially be
weaponized by extremist political parties (detailed in Chapter 3).
Economic Trajectory
During the early 90's, after removing themselves from Soviet rule in the communist
revolution of 1989, Poland's economy (e.g. unemployment, inequality, GDP per capita) dipped
below pre-transition levels (Keane & Prassad, 2002). Transitioning from a centrally planned
economy, to establishing the institutional aparatus necessary for a functioning market economy,
did not come without instability and uncertainty (Sachs, 1992). At the beginning of the transition,
Polands economy was among the worst in Europe, with an overly developed, inneficient industrial
sector that was entirely sheltered from the competitive open market forces beyond its borders
(Sachs, 1992). Opening the market, to allow for the economy to modernize and relevent sectors
(e.g. technology) to flourish, did not come without a considerable spike in unemployment, from
approximately 1% in 1990, to 11% at the end of 1991 (Sachs, 1992). To mitigate economic
hardship as outdated industries (e.g. labor-intensive farming, industrial manufacturing) were
transformed, certain social safety nets (e.g. housing subsidies, healthcare) were retained, and
subsequently fought over by competing parties representing divergent regional interests (Ordover,
1991; Domanski, 2003; Sachs, 1992).
In the mid-90s, once a sufficient institutional framework was established, the manufacture
of more sophisticated products increased, and firms learned how to sell in a rapidly changing
market (e.g. loss of the soviet market and competition from more advanced countries), economic
development (e.g. exports, GDP per capita) started to take shape (Domanski, 2003). However,
unemployment and income inequality remained as substantial problems into the early 2000's, as
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lagging regions failed to develop enough new indsustry to employ those that had been displaced
from changing market conditions. Eursceptic, populist parties (e.g. League of Polish Families,
Polish Paesant Party, Law and Justice, Polish People's Party), claiming to represent agrarian
interests and fight for national autonomy, specifically targeted such voters (Markowski & Tucker,
2010).
The temporal trajectory in the GINI coefficient for Poland, directly after the transition and
into the early 2000's, also reveals why political discontent, in lagging regions, may have emerged
(Keane & Prasad, 2002). According to statistical analysis performed by the Office for Economic
Coordination and Development (OECD), the GINI coefficient in Poland, just prior to the transition
in 1989, was 0.25, then fell to 0.23 during the initial transition in 1990 (OECD, 1997, p. 86; Keane
& Prasad, 2002). However, by 1991, as the unemployment rate climbed, so did the GINI
coefficient, increasing substantially to 0.26 and then stabilizing in the 0.29 to 0.30 range from 1993
to 1996 (OECD, 1997, p. 86; Keane & Prasad, 2002). Between 2002 to 2004, just prior to joining
the EU, Poland's GINI coefficient would again skyrocket to 34.5 points (World Bank Group,
2018). These GINI increases reflect regional economic disparities, as those regions relying on
labor-intensive agriculture remained stagnant while regions adopting new technological industry
flourished.
During the economic transition, in 1993, the unemployment rate jumped to staggering 16.4
percent, of the total population, while employment in manufacturing dropped to its lowest point
since the communist revolution. In response to faltering economic conditions, and a dissafected
populous, then President Walsea, founder of the soviet Solidarity movement and former labor
activist, dissolved the Polish parliament in 1993, necessitating the need for a premature election.
Presidential parliamentary dissolution was made possible through the construction of the 1992
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constitution, which allowed for the president to take initiative if there wasn't a constructive vote
of no confidence (Millard, 1994). During the campaign for the September 1993 parliamentary
election, talks of restoring Social Democrat egalitarianism (e.g. virulent critiques of capitalism),
and a protective welfare state, were introduced in the public discourse (Millard, 1994). Ultimately,
the Democratic-Left Alliance (SLD), which campaigned on a restoration of welfare programs, and
the Polish People's Party (PSL), representing conservative ideals and agrarian interests, together
won two-thirds of the vote and formed a majority coalition (Millard, 1994).
Regional Economic Analyses
Encompassing 16 economic regions in total, Poland's economy has traditionally been split
into two areas; the economically prosperous western and northern regions, and the econoically
lagging, largely agrarian, regions in the southeast (Bronisz, Heijman, & Miszczuk, 2008). During
the economic transition in the 90's, regions in the southeast of the country, whos economies were
largely based on labor intensive farming and the industrial manufacture of raw materials, were
those that were hardest hit by the push for modernization. According to the Office of Economic
Coordination and Development (OECD), for all years leading from the communist revolution in
1989 (except 2001 - 2003), inequality, in GDP per capita, has increased among Poland's 16
designated economic regions (OECD, 2013). This disparity can largely be contributed to the
country's most prosperous region, Mazowieckie (where the capital of Warsaw is located), gaining
considerably, while other regions in the east (e.g. Podkarpackie, Lubelskie, WarminskoMazurskie) continue to falter.
Because Mazowieckie modernized its economy, by incorporating skilled labor and a
technology sector, it has developed rapidly, with GDP per capita growing at an average rate of
6.6% from 1995 to 2005 (OECD, 2013). Meanwhile, because Podkarpackie continues to struggle
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in their transition away from labor-intensive agriculture and the manufacture of raw materials, it
was only capable of maintaining an average GDP per capita growth rate of 2.9% from 1995 to
2005 (OECD, 2013). Even more staggering are disparities in household income among the TL2
regions. According to the OECD, in 2010, the household income per capita (USD PPP Per Capita),
for the Mazowieckie region, was 12, 268 (OECD, 2013). The household income per capita (USD
PPP Per Capita), for Podkarpackie in 2010, was approximately half that of Mazowieckie, at 6,927.
Attraction of Populist Sovereignism
At the point of the 2015 Polish parliamentary elections, Poland's economy had stabilized
and advanced considerably relative to the 90's. According to the World Bank, the Polish economy
saw healthy growth leading to 2015, with a 3.3% increase in GDP per capita in 2014, and a 3.8%
increase, in GDP per capita, in 2015. By 2015, the unemployment rate also fell to 9.7%, the first
time it saw single-digits since the transition in 1990 (World Bank Group, 2018). However, it
appears that, despite recent economic successes, popular discontent over what was perceived as a
corrupt European Union has allowed the opportunity for parties, claiming to fight for national
sovereignism (e.g. Law and Justice), to gain considerable success (Markowski, 2016).
Since 2005, Poland has generally supported a party duopoly, between the liberalconservative, Social Democrat Civic Platform (PO) and the right-wing populist Law and Justice
(PiS) party, with many new, less impactful parties emerging (Sobkowicz, 2016). During the
campaign for the 2015 election, Law and Justice (PiS) coached itself as a representative of rural,
agrarian interests, which they proclaimed were threatened by a European Union elite that
supposedly favored western and central europe. It appears that PiS lured rural farmers in the east
by claiming they would demand that the European Union increase subsidies to rival those given to
farmers in Western Europe (Marcinkiewicz & Stegmaier, 2016). Meanwhile, PO appears to have
54

attempted to appeal to moderate voters, in high skilled positions and with foreign interests, that
have benefitted from European integration (Sobkowicz, 2016). The party has appealed especially
to those in the capital city of Warsaw, as well as to those economically prosperous regions in the
northwest. As an example of Warsaw's liberal political leanings, in 2017 thousands of citizens
protested in Warsaw against the governing PiS and new, radical policies, including a judiciary
overhaul that has enabled them to take control of the constitutional court, as well as many key
media platforms; a move that has prompted EU lawmakers to investigate PiS for allegedly
undermining the rule of law (Livingstone, 2017). When asked about the legitimacy of the protests,
leader of the PiS, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, told reporters that "only a total failure to see reality could
lead someone to the conclusion that there is a threat to freedom" (Livingstone, 2017).
PiS secured a resounding victory with 37.6% of the vote, while the incumbent PO only
secured 24.1% of the vote. Because PiS was capable in winning 235 of the 460 in the Sjem, and
61 of the 100 seats in the Senate, while other small parties were unable to pass the 5% threshold,
PiS also secured an absolute majority. In the 2015 presidential election, held in May, PiS had
already been successful in sending its representative, Andrzej Duda, to a victory with 51.5% of the
vote. This set of victories, where PiS holds both the presidential seat and an absolute majority in
parliament, makes them especially dangerous as a party, capable of governing autonomously and
passing legislation without contestation from rival parties.
The regional polarization in support for PO and PiS is clearly demarcated and was
especially evident during the 2015 parliamentary elections (Sobkowicz, 2016; Markowski, 2016).
Figure 2 (below) depicts the 2015 Sjem election by voting district. Both the Sjem (lower house)
and Senate (upper house) elections were held on October 25th, 2015, and regional maps of the
results between the two elections look nearly identical in the way parties are distributed. The
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campaign strategy adopted by Law and Justice (PiS), both presidential and parliamentary, appears
to be very much indicative of a far-right populist party, intent on representing rural, working-class
interests. PiS promised to increase welfare programs directed to those in rural localities in the east,
stop the European Union from forcing the refugee quota upon Poland, and tax supranational
banking institutions (Marcinkiewicz & Stegmaier, 2016). An example of their committing to such
campaign promises is the Banking Tax Act, which was passed shortly after PiS obtained power in

Figure 2: Results from the 2015 parliamentary Sjem election, divided by electoral region
and vote percentage. Law and Justice (far-right) (Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc) is depicted in
blue, while the Civic Platform (center-right) (Platforma Obywatelska) is depicted in orange.
Retreived from: Wikimedia commons on August 22nd, 2018.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Polish_Sejm_election_results_2015.svg
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2016. PiS maintained that it would fight against foreign lending institutions and insurers operating
in Poland, which they claimed did not care about the interests of the working class. The Banking
Tax Act of 2016 imposes a tax on the assets of foreign banks, cooperative savings funds and credit
institutions that exceed 4 billion PLN total, while also imposing a tax on both domestic and foreign
insurers, for assts that exceed 2 billion PLN total (Matusik, 2016). Revenue collected from the tax
is intended to fund another campaign promise, the implementation of a generous welfare package
for families, which included a guaranteed € 120 for every additional child after the first born
(Marcinkiewicz & Stegmaier, 2016; Matusik, 2016, Markowski, 2016). In another campaign
promise, PiS pledged to redact PO's unpopular, yet necessary legislation which raised the
retirement age (the point at which an individual can obtain retirement benefits from the state) to
67 (Markowski, 2016).
For the 2015 election, it appears that PO attempted to take advantage of Poland's political
polarization by pushing further to the left and adopting progressive identity politics. Leading up to
the election, by coordinating with other left-of-center parties in parliament at the time, PO passed
legislation on transgender rights and in-vitro fertilization (Marcinkiewicz & Stegmaier, 2016).
Previously, while allied with PO, Donald Tusk strongly cautioned against the implementation of
identity politics. However, it appears that the prime minister at the time, Ewa Kopacz (PO), felt it
necessary to move further to the left to attract voters (Marcinkiewicz & Stegmaier, 2016). The
strategy may have had the unintended consequence of inflaming an already dissafected
conservative portion of the population, feeding into the hands of the new, far-right nationalist party
Kukiz' 15 (detailed below).
As already mentioned above, when the refugee crisis hit its peak in September of 2015,
directly before the October election, PiS (and other, more radical parties like Kukiz'15) was
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provided with more material to fuel their Eurosceptic rhetoric. As Krzyznowski (2018) argued
(Figure 2.14, above), the EU's handling of the migrant crisis provoked a substantial, quantifiable
shift in the political discourse in Poland, quickly becoming a central issue. After the election, it
appears that PiS has continued a steady stream of anti-immigration, Eurosceptic rhetoric to keep
ahead of their political opponents for the next general election, which is scheduled for no later than
November of 2019. At a PiS press conference, held in Przysuch (60 miles south of Warsaw, known
for agriculture and a clay mine) in 2017, leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski told a televised crowd “We
have not exploited the countries from which these refugees are coming to Europe these days, we
have not used their labor force and finally we have not invited them to Europe. We have a full
moral right to say ‘no’” (Reuters Staff, 2017). Kaczynski also addressed the fact that, to continue
receiving regional development funds (which Poland's agrarian regions are heavily reliant upon),
Poland must comply with all EU mandates. Kaczynski acknowledged that the PiS backed the EU
in the 2004 expansion and appreciated the addition of EU development funds, but also stated that
“the fact that we appreciate them (the funds), does not mean that we have lost the right to various
assessments, including those regarding the historical context", arguing that Poland never received
compensation for damages sustained during WWII and should thus be held to a different set of
standards (Reuters Staff, 2017).
More recently (i.e. post 2015 elections), it appears that PiS' rhetoric regarding the refugee
crisis has been extended not only to refugees and asylum seekers but projected to any group
perceived and categorized as outsiders (e.g. Roma, Ukrainians, Muslims), including an increase in
anti-Semitic communications (Pankowski, 2018; Krzyznowski, 2018; Pedziwiatr, 2016). (I discuss
this phenomenon more in Chapter 3, but it is relevent for introducing the recent rise of the Kukiz'15
party and their performance in the 2015 election) In May of 2015, punk rock front man Pawel
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Kukiz organized a political movement (Kukiz'15) and announced he would be running in the
presidential election, with the backing of the ultranationalist, far-right National Movement (RN) .
Kukiz appealed to young Poles, including young males associated to futball hooliganry and NeoNazi skinhead movements, through strategic social media campaigns (Marcinkiewicz &
Stegmaier, 2016). Kukiz'15 positioned itself as a staunch anti-establishment party, set on an agenda
of introducing a full overhaul of the electoral system and increasing Polish sovereignty and
national identity. In the campaign for the 2015 election, Kukiz proposed abolishing Poland's 1997
constitution and "replacing the country's parliamentary system with a presidential one"
(Marcinkiewicz & Stegmaier, 2016). Kukiz'15 did surprisingly well in the 2015 parliamentary
election, capable of securing 29 of the 460 seats in the Sjem (lower house). Furthermore, Kukiz
himself can secure third place in the presidential elections, securing 21% of the total vote and
receiving 42% from voters between the ages 18 to 29 (Moskwa, 2015). Kukiz' strong stance against
immigration and the EU (detailed further in Chapter 3), as well as strong support in regions with
many unemployed youths, appears to have motivated PiS to adopt an even more radicalized
ideological position (detailed further in Chapter 3) to maintain voters for the November 2019
election. As public opinion polling shows (Figure 2.18, below), Kukiz'15 appears to be holding
steady around the 10% support mark, while PiS (top) saw a substantial increase in 2017, around
the same time that it started to engage in a more radicalized political agenda (detailed in Chapter
3).
IV. Hungary
On March 31, 1994, the Hungarian government filed its application to join the European
Union and, in 1998, the began formal accession negotiations with the EU. During the period where
the Hungarian government prepared for membership, from 1994, 1998, and 2002, four legislative
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terms transpired with some interruptions in the accession process (i.e. directive transposition,
compliance with ECJ rulings) (Batory, 2002). From 1994 to 1998, the Hungarian Socialist Party,
a legal successor to the former communist party, under the direction of Gyula Horn, reviewed the
bulk of Hungarian legislation to ensure that it came into compliance with EU norms (Batory,
2002). Among the most sensitive issues at the time were agricultural and financial provisions,
which could directly affect those in economically precarious, agrarian, northern and southern
plains regions (Batory, 2002). By 1998, with accession negotiations underway, the threat of
European marketization, which could adversely affect those in rural, agricultural regions, appears
to have provided fertile ground for Fidesz, a national-conservative and right-wing populist party
lead by prominent politician Viktor Orban (Batory, 2002).
In the 1998 parliamentary election, the ruling coalition that ushered in the EU negotiations,
consisting of The Hungarian Socialist party (MSZP) and the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ),
was ousted by a right-wing coalition led by Fidesz - Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz-MPP)
(Benoit, 2002). The actual seat share won in the election shows a radical shift relative to the 1994
election. In 1994, Fidesz published in its party manifesto that it was a staunch supporter of adopting
the quickest method possible for joining the EU (Batory, 2002). However, by 1998, and amid poor
economic conditions (discussed further below), Fidesz shifted towards a more eurosceptic
position, advertising itself as a vigilant and aggressive defender against the possibility of
supranational interest superseding national autonomy (Batory, 2002). Fidesz, led by Viktor Orban,
can secure 148 seats in Hungary's unicameral parliament, a gain of 128 seats over the last election,
while MSZP won 134 seats, 75 less than the previous election (Benoit, 2002). Fidesz formed a
coalition with the Independent Smallholders, Agrarian Workers and Civic Party, which won 48
parliamentary seats.
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As Popescu & Toka (2002) note, media coverages, and popular opinion, regarding the
economy (detailed further below) were heavily negative at the time, which may have hurt the
incumbent MSZP in the 1998 election. Fidesz utilized private media channels to campaign on a
platform promoting their fight against alleged government corruption, law and order, and calls for
higher welfare spending and the protection of economic interests in rural, agrarian regions
(Popescu & Toka, 2002). By July 2002, under the Fidesz lead government, Hungary succeeded in
completing negotiations with the European Union on 26 of the 31 chapters of the Acquis
Communautaire (Batory, 2002). Of the chapters which remained in question were those primarily
involving agricultural interests. Among the most contentious issues at the time, in which Fidesz
asserted itself as a protector of national interests, was legalizing the ability for foreign (EU)
nationals to purchase Hungarian farmland; a point of legislation where Fidesz pushed back against
the EU (Batory, 2002). Viktor Orban's cabinet seemingly circumvented this issue by reaching an
agreement in the accession negotiations, where Hungary would legalize the acquisition of farmland
only three to seven years after accession (Batory, 2002). Fidesz also promoted an emphasis on
national sovereignism, by passing nationalistic legislations such as the 'status law', which secured
rights in employment, education, and social services to foreign nationals that could prove
Hungarian descent (e.g. Magyar minority in Slovakia) (Batory, 2002). Fidesz generally regarded
the "Hungarian nation" as encompassing both ethnic Hungarians residing within Hungarian
borders, as well as neighboring countries, while the Hungarian Socialist Party (Fidesz's primary
opposition) only acknowledged those residing within Hungarian borders. The status law strained
diplomatic relations with Slovakia and Romania, who claimed that the act motivated the
discrimination of Romanian and Slovakian nationals attempting to enter the Hungarian labor
market (Batory, 2002).
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During the campaign for the 2002 parliamentary elections, Viktor Orban and Fidesz
continued promoting itself as a protector of national interests and the agrarian working class (Racz,
2003; Batory, 2002). Fidesz ran on the slogan of "Hungary at the heart of Europe", and continued
to emphasize, in its party manifesto and in campaign speeches, that it had "succeeded in protecting
Hungarian land, which foreign persons or corporations cannot buy" (Batory, 2002). Meanwhile,
the Hungarian Socialist Party (henceforth referred to as MSZP) also positioned itself as a protector
of national interests, by negotiating deals, on issues related to economic reform and agriculture,
with Brussels that would benefit the country (Batory, 2002). The party criticized the antagonistic
approach taken by Viktor Orban and Fidesz, who they claimed handled negotiations with "an
aggressive tone, unnecessary conflicts with, and patronizing of, the negotiation partners" (Batory,
2002; Kovacs, 2002). The party also promised to attempt to reinstate the social welfare programs
that it had trouble implementing during the economic transition (i.e. 1994 -1998) and associated
economic strife (detailed below). Ultimately, MSZP secured a slim, surprise victory by winning
178 seats and forming a coalition with the Alliance of Free Democrats party (SZDSZ), which won
20 seats. The incumbent Fidesz came close to winning a majority again, securing 164 seats. Figure
2.19 (below) depicts the change in parliamentary seats, among dominant parties in Hungary, from
1990 to 2002.
In the 2002 election, regional patterns in voting behavior were somewhat consistent with
the economic disparities that existed at the time (Racz, 2002). Hungary's economic regions
(discussed in further detail below) are typically divided along a south-west/north-east axis, where
western regions, spanning from Budapest to the Austrian border (i.e. Transdanubia), are more
economically advanced. Regions in central Hungary, and to the north-east (especially along the
border with eastern Slovakia), which rely on labor-intensive agriculture and crude manufacturing,
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have lagged economically (Racz, 2002). It appears that MSZP's message, which focused heavily
on increasing social welfare programs (e.g. pensions, unemployment subsidies) directed towards
those that had been displaced during the economic transition, resonated in predominantly
agricultural in the eastern regions (Racz, 2002). Except for Budapest, the majority of MSZP's votes
were won in rural, agricultural regions in the east (Racz, 2003). According to Racz (2003), during
the final weeks of the campaign, Fidesz intensified its campaign in Hungary's agricultural regions,
spreading fear of a potential restoration of communism if the socialist MSZP was voted in.
Although Fidesz positioned itself as a fierce defender of agrarian interests and nationalism, it's
possible that their (at the time) liberal-conservative platform (e.g. advocating for a free market)
did not appeal enough to those in economically lagging, agricultural regions (Racz, 2003).
Additionally, Fidesz's nationalistic tendencies may have not been appealing to those residing in
the cosmopolitan metropolis surrounding Budapest (Palonen, 2009). Fidesz generally performed
well in the Transdanubia regions in the west, as well as more rural regions in the southeast.
Ultimately, the left won by a very slim margin, garnering 2,675,081 popular votes, compared to
the right, which won 2,306,763. For MSZP, the distribution of the popular vote, among Hungary's
single member districts, translated to 178 parliamentary seats, while Fidesz secured 168 (Figure
2.19, above). Although MSZP formed a coalition with AFD, which secured 20 parliamentary seats,
it failed to secure the two-thirds majority necessary to pass legislation seamlessly, leaving Fidesz
with the ability to obstruct policies inconsistent with its agenda.
While the MSZP - AFD coalition governed, from 2002 to 2006, it was capable of
transposing the legislation necessary to comply with the remaining 5 chapters of the EU acquis,
addressing agricultural and economic policies, which were left unfinished by Fidesz. This allowed
Hungary to be included in the 2004 EU expansion, along with Hungary and Poland (among others).
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Despite the accession, Hungary continued to experience poor economic conditions (discussed
further below) under the MSZP-AFD government, with an extensive debate (from both sides) on
the extent to which the welfare state should be implemented, as well as if the "shock therapy"
associated to rapid liberal marketization was best for the country (Korkut, 2012, pp. 151 - 155).
Laszlo Bekeski, who served as Minister of Finance for MSZP, admitted publicly that "the
Hungarian economy resembles a feeble organism with a weak immune system" (Korkut, 2012, p.
152). MSZP adopted the policy that the only method for improving economic conditions
downstream would be to continue to engage in economic liberalization and reform the agricultural
sector to make it competitive with the rest of Europe. Laszlo Bekeski argued that "Hungary can
only trigger recovery with reform steps geared towards improving its competitiveness" (Korkut,
2012, p. 152).
Prior to, and directly after the 2006 parliamentary election, Hungarian politics was
composed of intense polarization, primarily surrounding issues related to the economy and the EU
negotiations. Polarization existed between Fidesz and the incumbent MSZP, in a manner that
resembled two rival forms of populism (Palonen, 2009). MSZP focused on a large, redistributive
welfare state, to include all those residing within Hungary's borders, while Fidesz focused on
building a sovereign nation state, with a common "Hungarian" ethnic identity that would include
Magyars in neighboring countries (Palonen, 2009; Korkut, 2012). Polarization would lead to
political scandal and large-scale political protests. The primary issue surrounding the polarization
was the lagging nature of the economy (discussed in greater depth below), which was expected to
improve after EU accession (Palonen, 2009). MSZP was capable of securing 198 parliamentary
seats, under the leadership of the new prime minister Ferenc Gyurcsany, defeating Fidesz, which
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secured 164. MSZP formed a coalition with the Alliance of Free Democrats, which secured 3 seats
to barely pass the 5% threshold mandated for faction representation.
Directly after the election, political turmoil emerged as new reports were released
indicating that the state of the economy was significantly worse than what prime minister
Gyurcsany and MSZP stated during the campaign. Prime minister Gyurcsany gave his famous
Oszod speech at a private MSZP party congressional convention, in which he admitted that the
party had lied during the campaign to maintain the status quo (Palonen, 2009). During the speech,
Gyurcsany is quoted as having stated that "we lied, morning, noon, and night", while also calling
for a massive series of economic reforms to correct the mistakes made in the past (Palonen, 2009).
In an excerpt of the speech, Gyurcsany stated that "There is not much choice. There is not, because
we screwed up. Not a little, a lot. No European country has done something as boneheaded as we
have. Evidently, we lied throughout the last year-and-a-half, two years. It was totally clear that
what we are saying is not true. You cannot quote any significant government measure we can be
proud of, other than at the end we managed to bring the government back from the brink. Nothing.
If we have to give account to the country about what we did for four years, then what do we say"
(BBC News, 2006). When the speech was leaked, first on the public Magyar Radio then spreading
to other media channels, civil unrest emerged, and anti-government protests were staged (Palonen,
2009; BBC News, 2006). Violent riots, which injured over 150 people and involved the
deployment of military tanks, were initiated primarily in Budapest, but in other cities throughout
Hungary, as well as among the Magyar minority in Romania (BBC News, 2006). Protesters, which
congregated outside of the ministerial mansion, called for the resignation of Gyurcsany. The
Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) party, a right-wing populist party, which formed three
years prior in 2003, also appears to have played a role in organizing the protests.
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In seeing an opportunity to capitalize on the political discontent that emerged from the
Oszod speech, Viktor Orban and Fidesz, which composed the parliamentary opposition at the time,
petitioned for a formal vote of no confidence, while simultaneously drafting new revisions to the
constitution. Shortly after, Hungarian president Laszlo Solyom ordered the prime minister to
initiate a parliamentary vote of no confidence, and, after apologizing publicly, Gyurcsany and
MSZP remained in power with 207 MP's voting for, and 167 MP's (all members of Fidesz-MPP)
voting against the government (Palonen, 2009). After the vote, Viktor Orban organized a
nationalist protest of over 50,000 citizens, who convened at the parliamentary headquarters in
Budapest waving Hungarian flags and calling for the removal of MSZP (Palonen, 2009).
The political turmoil that emerged under the leadership of MSZP seems to have fueled a
conservative, populist backlash in the country, which came to a head during the 2010
parliamentary campaign with effects (e.g. the emerging popularity of the radical-right Jobbik
party) that have lasted well into 2018 (Korkut, 2012, p. 161-165; Agh, 2016). Fidesz, along with
its alliance partner, the Christian Democrat People's Party (KDNP), secured a landslide victory,
winning 263 of the 368 parliamentary seats. The victory of the Fidesz-KDNP alliance, securing a
two-thirds parliamentary majority, firmly entrenched Viktor Orban as a prime minister with
significant legislative power. The radical, right-wing populist Jobbik party also saw its first
electoral success since its inception in 2003, securing 47 parliamentary seats. MSZP, while under
new leadership with Attila Mesterhazy, severely plummeted from popularity, only securing 59
seats (a loss of 133 over the previous election). After seizing control of the government with an
over two-thirds supermajority, Fidesz and Viktor Orban (who began to transform himself into a
political "strongman") saw the opportunity to enact sweeping institutional reforms in a bid to
centralize and consolidate their power in government (specific legislation discussed in Chapter 3).
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Economic Trajectory
In 1989, when Hungary left the centrally-planned economy organized by the Soviet regime,
it embarked on an effort to engage in economic marketization, by establishing a sound institutional
framework and reducing its reliance on underperforming industries (e.g. agriculture,
manufacturing) by developing knowledge-based sectors (Lengyal & Leydesdorff, 2011). The
initial "shock therapy" associated to economic liberalization, which took place in the early 90's,
left Hungary with a set of serious economic imbalances by 1994 (The World Bank Group, 2003).
Except for Budapest, Hungary had difficulty absorbing new knowledge-based industries, a
problem that persisted even after EU accession (Lengyal & Leydesdorff, 2011). The government
deficit skyrocketed to 8.4% of GDP while the public debt reached 88% of GDP (Zidek, 2014).
Around the same period, inflation increased 18.8% from what it was in 1990 (Zidek, 2014). The
unemployment rate also increased to 11% as labor-intensive agriculture and crude manufacturing
sectors attempted to modernize (Zidek, 2014). Zidek (2014) states that, in 1994, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) ranked Hungary as the third most vulnerable economy in the world. Not
surprisingly, the state of the economy during the mid-90's motivated the political discontent
discussed above.
During the 1995 parliamentary election, the Social Democrats (MSZP) campaigned, and
won the election, on a platform that promised a significant stimulus package and sweeping
economic reforms (Zidek, 2014). Shortly after the election, the MSZP lead government, with the
assistance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), developed an economic reform plan known
as the Bokros package, named after the then Minister of Finance Lajos Bokros (Zidek, 2014). To
ensure proper economic development, the IMF also provided the government with a 300 million
(USD) loan. The Bokros package imposed surcharges on imports (other than investments in the
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country), tightened benefit packages to citizens (e.g. childcare, unemployment), and privatized the
banking sector, which allowed foreign financial institutions to seize Hungarian banks (Zidek,
2014). Between 1995 and 1998, the government also implemented a set of sweeping structural
reforms and a fiscal stabilization package (The World Bank, 2003). As a result, the economy began
to recover in the latter half of the 90's, seeing an average GDP per capita growth of 4.4% between
1997 to 2001 (The World Bank Group, 2003). As the economy stabilized, and new knowledgebased sectors flourished (primarily in Budapest), the unemployment rate (Figure 2.21, below),
which peaked in 1993 at approximately 12.5 % of the total labor force, also started to decline into
the early 2000's, with some increase associated to the marketization that would come with EU
accession (The World Bank Group, 2003; Zidek, 2014) .
Regional Analyses
During its initial transition to a market economy, economic disparities began to emerge
between the generally cosmopolitan Budapest region, which embraced knowledge-based sectors,
and the Hungarian countryside, which was predominantly comprised by agricultural industries
(Nagy, 1994). As Nagy (1994) argues, Hungary is comprised of a single urban center, with
considerable intellectual, cultural, and political significance (as well as 20% of the total
population), which has attracted considerable foreign direct investment and joint ventures, while
the rest of the country is mere periphery. For comparison, in 1993 the unemployment rate in
Budapest was 7%, while Szabolcs-Szatmar-Bereg, located in the agricultural-based northern plains
region that straddles Slovakia and the Ukraine, experienced an unemployment rate of 26.8%
(Nagy, 1994). Northern Transdanubia, which borders Austria, also saw considerable
entrepreneurial activity after an initial economic dip, while central and southern Transdanubia
exhibited significant instability for their reliance on an outdated mining industry and having a
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demography comprised of many dwarf villages (Nagy, 1994). MSZP, and other left-leaning parties
(e.g. Alliance of Free Democrats), have traditionally done well in the regions surrounding
Budapest, while Fidesz and Jobbik have seen their primary support base stemming from the plains
regions.
Lengyel & Leydesdorff (2011) claim that after EU accession, Hungary continued to
experience considerable regional economic disparities, and innovation systems in each part of the
country have not contributed to an integrated national economic system. Economic disparities are
exemplified by Hungary's GINI coefficient. After the initial economic transition in the 90's, the
GINI coefficient remained stable at approximately 28 points, but saw a spike after EU accession
in 2004, rising to 34.7 points by 2005 (The World Bank Group, 2018). It is presumed that this
spike reflects the success of the Budapest region after streamlining economic coordination with a
broader European market, which likely also contributed to discontent in lagging regions.
Lengyel & Leydesdorff (2011) argue that Hungary is now comprised of three separate
economic innovation systems, including " (1) the capital Budapest (which) can be characterized
as a metropolitan innovation system, and operates increasingly on a par with Vienna, Prague, and
Munich as centers for knowledge-intensive services and knowledge based manufacturing; (2) the
north-western parts of the country have been absorbed into the Western-European innovation
systems surrounding it; and (3) the eastern and southern parts of the country are still predominantly
integrated within old systems dynamics" (p. 4). The "old system dynamics" refer to labor-intensive
agricultural sectors, which were sheltered from open market forces during the soviet regime, that
are organized with a heavy reliance on national subsidies and EU regional development funds
(Lengyel & Leydesdorff, 2011). These regions seem to be especially prone to adopting the populist
messages of both the Fidesz and Jobbik party.
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The Attraction of Populist Sovereignism
According to the European Roma Rights Center (ERRC), public opinion surveys,
conducted during the refugee crisis, indicate that over 72 percent of Hungarians hold an
unfavorable disposition towards Muslims, a feature that has provided radical-right parties with a
constituency willing to lend an ear to their position (Rorke, 2018). The 2015 refugee crisis, and
the EU's relocation scheme to alleviate the burden on Italy and Greece, seems to have been taken
as an opportunity, by Viktor Orban, as well as the Jobbik party, to reject EU policy and signal their
willingness to defend Hungarian sovereignty against an alleged supranational political elite
(Fekete, 2016). Regarding the refugees and asylum seekers, Viktor Orban has stated in public
interviews that "we don't see these people as Muslim refugees, we see them as Muslim invaders"
and "for us migration is not a solution but a problem ... not medicine but a poison, we don’t need
it and won’t swallow it" (Rorke, 2018).
Unlike Poland and Slovakia, who's governments also responded negatively towards the
EU's handling of the crisis, Hungary did serve as a major transitory route for over 350,000
refugees, which reached its peak in September of 2015 (Kallius, Monterescu, & Rajaram, 2016).
The refugees, primarily from Syria and Afghanistan, entered Europe through Greece and traveled
northward, entering Hungary through its southern borders with Serbia and Croatia, to eventually
reach Germany (Kallius, Monterescu, & Rajaram, 2016). In total, Hungary received approximately
8.5% of the total asylum-seekers in Europe, between 2015 and 2016, at a total of 202,321 persons
(Zaun, 2018). When the total Hungarian population is taken into consideration, Hungary received
20.55 asylum seekers per thousand capita, the highest ratio out of all the EU countries (Zaun,
2018). For comparative purposes, Germany housed 48.8% of the European total, between 2015
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and 2016, at 1,163,677 persons total (Zaun, 2018). When their total population is taken into
consideration, Germany held 14.29 per thousand capita (Zaun, 2018).
To signal their stance to protect Hungary, one of the first measures adopted by Fidesz was
the erection of billboards throughout Hungary, written in Hungarian, cautioning refugees not to
take jobs away from Hungarians, as well as to respect Hungarian laws (Agh, 2016). On October
15, 2015, the Hungarian government announced that it was in a "state of migration emergency"
along Hungary's southern border (Fekete, 2016). Rather than framing the refugee crisis as a
humanitarian emergency, rhetoric perpetuated by the Orban government framed the situation as a
"Muslim invasion" and a threat to national sovereignty (Fekete, 2016; Agh, 2016).
According to Kallius, Monterescu, & Rajaram (2016), the Fidesz-KDNP government
maintained a steady rhetorical discourse, which framed the refugees as potential criminals and
threats to national security, by highlighting terrorist attacks that have occurred in other EU
countries (e.g. France). The government has also expressed that the predominantly Muslim
immigrants do not belong in the allegedly homogenous, Christian society in Hungary, stating that
they are culturally incompatible (Baczynska, 2017). Viktor Orban has also blamed the refugee
crisis on the alleged dealings of a parasitic, globalist deep state linked to the EU, which, as he
claims, has planned to destroy a homogenous Hungarian society through multiculturalism and
liberalism (Haraszti, 2015). Orban also publicly accused MEP's in the European Parliament of
conspiring to change the demographic composition of Europe, announcing on Hungarian public
radio that "Europeans will not become a minority in our own Continent" (Mischke, 2018; Fekete,
2016).
Despite warnings from the EU, the Hungarian government adopted the policy of
immobilization, initiating a military build-up along its border with Serbia and Croatia, which
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involved the erection of barbed wire fencing, detainment camps, and a significant presence of
military personnel (Fekete, 2016; Kallius, Monterescu, & Rajaram, 2016). In 2017, the European
Union announced that it would be launching litigation proceedings against Hungary for failing to
meet the quota allocation set by the EU. When the disciplinary litigation was put to a vote in the
European Parliament, more than the necessary two-thirds majority voted in favor of proceeding
with the case, signaling that it found Hungary liable for breaching the fundamental human rights
values detailed in Article 2 of the Treaty of Nice, thus necessitating the need to trigger Article 7
proceedings (Mischke, 2018). If the European Court finds that the Hungarian Government did
breach the treaty, it can impose heavy fines and restrict funding (Mischke, 2018).
The announcement that the EU was going to proceed with litigation against Hungary did
not come without a considerable backlash from Viktor Orban and Fidesz. In his State of the Union
address, for 2018, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker announced that the EU
was planning to substantially bolster border security, with the aspiration of hiring over 10,000
more border security officials by 2020 (Mischke, 2018). Viktor Orban spun this plan as an
aggression on Hungary, stating publicly that the EU wanted to "send mercenaries" to its country
to prevent "Hungarian sons" from protecting their border (Mishke, 2018).
The refugee situation, and subsequent responses by the EU, appears to have motivated
Hungary's populist parties to refocus their rhetoric towards defending Hungary against the
perceived threats (e.g. national security, welfare allocations, crime) posed by those ascribed as
categorical outsiders, including the Roma minority in the region (discussed in greater depth in
Chapter 3) (Fekete, 2016; Haraszti, 2015). The Hungarian Roma minority is estimated to be
approximately 7.49 percent of the total population (as of 2012), at 750,000 persons, and has faced
considerable integration challenges, existing primarily in segregated, destitute ghettos (European
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Commission, 2014). Rhetoric, which broadly frames all of those perceived as outsiders as threats
and burdens to a homogenous Hungarian state, appears to have been used strategically in the 2018
parliamentary elections. In the lead up to the election, Viktor Orban's chief of staff claimed that
Roma relations in the region, which have been highly counterproductive, should be taken as
evidence that asylum-seekers will not be able to integrate with the majority population successfully
(Bayer, 2018; European Commission, 2014). During a campaign speech held in the village of
Martely (located in the economically lagging Southern Great Plains region), Viktor Orban told a
crowd of supporters "we have been living with the Gypsies for 600 years and to this day we still
haven’t been able to integrate them” (Bayer, 2018) In the same speech, Orban addressed the
refugee problem by claiming “it’s a fairytale that we can integrate them" (Bayer, 2018).
Just prior to the election, Viktor Orban published an anti-immigration video, on his official
Facebook page, that was filmed in the northern town of Miskolc, which is known for having
authorities conduct pogrom-like evictions of Roma villages in the past (Orban, 2018; Walker,
2018; Bayer, 2018). In the video, Orban is seen greeting locals (e.g. police officers, construction
workers) in a friendly manner, while he orates on both the refugee and Roma problem. Regarding
Hungary's handling of the situation, Orban states "There are two paths ahead of Hungary to choose
from: we will either have a national government, in which case we will not become an immigrant
country, or the people of a George Soros form of government, in which case Hungary will become
an immigrant country" (Walker, 2018). After, he states "now, just imagine when people with a
different culture, habits and view of life come here from outside our borders" (Walker, 2018). In
addressing integration concerns, Orban explains that newcomers (referencing the Roma and
Muslim migrations from North Africa) typically gravitate to cities, like Miskolc and Budapest,
while arguing that "they are places where ghettos are established, its where no-go zones, parallel
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societies, the difficulties of coexistence and the deterioration of public security occur" (Walker,
2018). In an interview on Hungarian public radio, conducted just after the 2018 parliamentary
election, Orban stated that "the main task of the new government will be to preserve Hungary's
security and Christian culture" (Wrobel, 2018). In the same interview, Orban addressed his stance
on the European Union by explaining "we believe in the importance of the nation, and in Hungary,
we do not want to yield ground to any supranational business or political empire" (Wrobel, 2018).
Public opinion polling shows that Fidesz, and the radical right Jobbik party (addressed in Chapter
3), have held a dominant lead in Polish politics since the downfall of MSZP in 2010, indicating
that Fidesz experienced an increase in popularity around October of 2015, the point of time when
the refugee crisis had hit its peak (Kallius, Monterescu, & Rajaram, 2016).
Based on the overwhelming support Fidesz had leading up to the 2018 parliamentary
election, as reflected in all the public opinion polling that had been done in the region, it is perhaps
no surprise that Fidesz would dominate the election. Fidesz was able to secure 133 seats in
parliament, well past the 100-member threshold for a majority. Additionally, the Jobbik party was
capable of securing 26 seats, an increase of 3 seats over the election in 2014. In its first attempt to
reenter politics since the political scandal that emerged in 2010, MSZP, under new leadership from
Gergely Karacsony, secured 20 parliamentary seats. A regional analyses of voting behavior is
revealing of the economic disparities that exist between the cosmopolitan region surrounding
Budapest, in comparison to the more agricultural, conservative plains regions. The left of center
MSZP garnered most of its votes solely from Budapest and the voting districts surrounding it.
Fidesz, on the other hand, won almost all other electoral districts in the country.
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Chapter 3
The Resurgence of Radicalism

I. Features of Radicalism
In situations where lagging economic conditions are coupled with supranational policy
directives, which are perceived as unfair and a threat to national sovereignty, a dissafected
population may be willing to lend an ear to populist political entrepreneurs pushing a
nationalistic agenda. In such instances, where populist movements secure significant
representation, if not total outright government control, there seems to be a natural progression to
an increasingly radicalized agenda. Several factors can contribute to the phenomena, including
party competition and critical issues, such as the refugee crisis and subsequent responses by the
EU and populist movements. In the case studies detailed in Chapter 2, it was observed that
populist movements used the refugee crisis to crystallize their support. Competition from other
smaller, even more radical parties (e.g. Jobbik), also seems to have pushed populist movements
further towards radicalization to retain votes. In instances where populist movements secure
parliamentary majorities (e.g. Poland, Hungary), a radicalized agenda can take the form of
dismantling the various institutions (e.g. impartial judiciaries, electoral laws) which secure a
proper set of checks and balances, as well as engaging in an extreme and, often, conspiratorial
rhetoric against threats to their power.
In most cases, populism does not pose an existential threat to democracy (Mudde, 2004,
p. 279). As Taggart (2004) has stated, populist parties will "usually fade fast" (p. 270). However,
there are cases in which populist sovereignist have become radicalized while in power,
eventually attacking the various policies and institutions associated with liberal democracy and
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fueling dramatic social strife. One such instance of the latter is the HDZ single party
government, under the rule of Franjo Tudjman, in the Croatian government of the 1990's
(Mudde, 2004, p. 280; Lindstrom, 2003).
In 1990, amid the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, the Croatian Democratic Union
(henceforth referred to as HDZ), campaigned to win seats in the newly formed multi-party,
unicameral parliamentary system in Croatia. Riding on a wave of political dissidence, HDZ, led
by Franjo Tudjman, campaigned on a strong nativist platform pushing for hostile irredentism
(Uzelak, 1997; Mudde, 2004, p. 279). Tudjman's radicalized, nationalistic rhetoric often
exemplified that of an authoritarian "strong man", in which he asserted total control over
decision making, as well as displaying a general unwillingness to respect national institutions.
Tudjman is quoted as having stated publicly "Those who are raising the question about
the building of the Presidential Palace, yacht, or buying the presidential airplane, are belonging
to those Yugo-unitarists, in other words, to remnants of the Yugo-communist ideology, who
cannot accept the fact that Croatia has become a sovereign state which has its own Head of
State...." (Uzelak, 1997). A feature of Tudjman's authoritarian "strong man" nature was his
critical, and somewhat patronizing stance towards the press, often directing journalists on what
and how to write on specific issues. Tudjman would often urge the press to emphasize the
common history of Croats, especially in their reporting on diplomatic issues (Uzelak, 1997).
While in power in the early 90's, Tudjman not only pushed a strong nativist discourse by
reminding the country of a common history among Croats, but consistently reminded the country
of threats from neighboring countries (e.g. Italy, Serbia, Bosnia - Herzegovina ), which, as he
stressed, held hostile irredentist dispositions (Razsa & Lindstrom, 2004, Uzelak, 1997). Stressing
the common language binding Croats, and threats to solidarity from the country's Italian
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minority, Tudjman stated in an interview that "bilingualism cannot be allowed in the whole
Country [Istria], nor in general and public life, because it would mean that the sovereignty of the
Croatian people as a majority in the whole Country's territory, would be compromised for an
incomparably small Italian national minority" (Uzelak, 1997). Tudjman clearly outlined the
enemies of the Croatian nation state while stressing that the land had always belonged to the
Croatian people, who, again, shared a common history. Targeting Serbians that were residing
within Croatian borders (and seeking their own autonomy), Tudjman stated in a political speech
that "Serbs are a national minority who live on a territory that never belonged to them" (Uzelak,
1997). Amid an already tense relationship with neighboring Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Tudjman's nativist rhetoric appears to have partially fueled the war, and genocide, that would
soon follow.
Radicalized political movements attempt to build national solidarity and gain power by
defining the ethnic markers (e.g. common language, customs) that bind citizens, emphasize a
common history tied to a specific region, and clearly outline threats (e.g. categorical outsiders
including minorities and immigrants, supranational political entities like the EU and NATO) to
the sovereignty of the nation state. In the case of HDZ, which held a dominant majority in
Croatia's unicameral government, no sufficient checks (e.g. viable competing parties, rejection
by the public) existed to prevent the cascade of nativist rhetoric that would later fuel war and
genocide between Croats, Serbs, and Bosnians. Although not quite as extreme, the same
rudimentary features that constitute radical political extremism can be observed among
movements in Slovakia, Poland and Hungary.

77

II. Slovakia
Slovakia has experienced various forms of political extremism tracing its roots to the
revolution of 1989 (Nociar, 2012). At its most severe, far-right extremism has taken the form of
hostile racism directed towards Roma and Hungarian minorities (Mudde, 2005). Do specific
factors (e.g. economic conditions, supranational and national policies) provide a fertile ground
for the development of such extreme political expressions?
In the early 90's, directly after the communist revolution, Slovakia saw the emergence of
numerous political movements adopting extremist, racist (e.g. anti-Semitic, anti-Roma, neo-Nazi
"White Power") ideologies, in a backlash against Soviet rule (Milo, 2005). White supremacist
and skinhead movements (e.g. Slovakia Hammerskins, Blood & Honour Division Slovakia,
White Power Party) exerted a strong attraction for youngsters between the ages of 14 to 26 in
regions with high unemployment (Milo, 2005). These initial extremist movements where
relatively uncoordinated, thus unable to challenge mainstream political parties in regional and
national governments (Milo, 2005). Important leaders of populist sovereigntist political parties
learned their trade in such movements. For instance, the leader of the L-SNS party, Marian
Kotleba, started his political career in such a movement, the Slovak Togetherness, a far-right,
white supremacist civic association that eventually was legally dissolved by the Slovak supreme
court (Spac & Voda, 2014; Kluknavska, 2014; Kluknavska, 2015). While acting as the leader of
Slovak Togetherness, Kotleba organized skinhead marches through Roma villages, while
adorning uniforms from the fascist Hlinka Guard, a movement that collaborated with the
German Third Reich from 1938 to 1945 (Spac & Voda, 2014).
While acting as the mayor of the Banska Bystrica region of central Slovakia
(economically lagging, as discussed in Ch. 2), from 2013 to 2017, Marian Kotleba controlled
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local newspaper Bystrica Kraj. On a recurring basis, Bystrica Kraj has published a range of
political satire, both anti-Semitic and anti-Roma in its messaging. (United States Department of
State, 2015). In a section critical of bankers and the substantial debt crisis among citizens in the
region, the paper published an anti-Semitic cartoon depicting a banker with a long nose and curly
hair, which was a direct copy of an anti-Semitic, Nazi-era propaganda poster (United States
Department of State, 2015). After continually propagating anti-Semitic and anti-Roma rhetoric,
citizens began to file complaints and government subsidies were removed from the taxpayer
funded Bystrica Kraj.
The Slovak government revised its constitution in 1992 by including specific human
rights clauses, with the aspiration of eventually joining the European Union. Article 12 of the
1992 constitution grants inalienable, equal rights to all citizens of the Slovak Republic,
regardless of race, ethnicity or nationality, religion, and sex (Mihalik, 2014). However, because
the People's Party - Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (henceforth referred to as L'S-HZDS),
led by Vladamir Meclar, was nativistic in its orientation, opportunities were created to legally
discriminate against the Roma and Hungarian (Magyar) minorities. In particular, in 1995 an
amendment "language law" was added to the 1992 constitution, which mandated that, in regions
with over a 20 % minority population, the national language (i.e. Slovak) must be used in all
official communications, including those in health, education, and employment systems
(Mihalik, 2014). By adding this amendment, L'S-HZDS replaced the previously policy held by
Czechoslovakia, which allowed districts, with over a 20% minority composition, to retain the
language most closely associated with their ethnicity (Gonzalez, 2001, p. 303 ) The language law
had the effect of severely inhibiting non-Slovak speakers (e.g. Roma, Magyars) from easily
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accessing governmental services, such as the education and the healthcare systems (Mihalik,
2014).
In 2009, while a parliamentary coalition existed between SMER-SD, SNS, and L'SHZDS (then led by Vladamir Meclar), the Slovak government revised the language law
amendment, making illegal to conduct business, print books or journals, and use sign language in
public in any language other than Slovak (BBC News, 2009). After receiving a written warning
for a first violation, fines for further violations were set to up to 5,000 euro (BBC News, 2009).
The move incited outrage among Slovakia's ethnic Magyars concentrated in the southern
districts, as well as strained diplomatic relations with Hungary (BBC News, 2009). Shortly after
the law was enacted, in September of 2009, more than 10,000 ethnic Hungarians congregated
and protested in a soccer stadium in Dunajska Streda, a majority Hungarian town of
approximately 22,000 in southern Slovakia (BBC News, 2009). The protest was conducted to
persuade lawmakers to remove the law. Regarding the language law, Peter Pazmany, of the
Hungarian Coalition Party (a party fighting for Hungarian minority representation in the Slovak
parliament), told BBC reporters that the law made no sense and only created social tension
(BBC news, 2009).
The political debate surrounding the revision to the language law in 2009 incited a flurry
of radicalized rhetoric that emphasized the "common history" of both Slovakia and Hungary
(Pytlas, 2013). Specifically, instances in which the ethnic Slovak population in Hungary
experienced marginalization, stemming back to a forced migration when the catholic Habsburg
empire overran protestant rule in the region (Örkény & Sik, 2011). SMER, SNS, and L'S-HZDS,
members of a right-leaning, nationalistic parliamentary coalition, played what Pytlas (2013)
referred to as the 'Hungarian card'. Here, rhetoric focused on the 'cultural domination' of ethnic
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Slovaks in the former Kingdom of Hungary (Orkney & Sik, 2011; Pytlas, 2013). The SNS has
adopted a strong nativist nationalist political platform. On its party website, in 2005, it declared
that "Nation is an ethnic togetherness, the constant ethnic space, and the only way of entering it
is to be born into it. Nation is defined by what is given forever and is unchangeable: lineage,
origin, and the blood of forefathers, national mythology, and language. Nation and national
membership are the real heritage, formed by history, which is given to everyone by his/her birth"
(Milos, 2005, p. 213).
In Slovakia, radicalized political rhetoric, which seeks to build support by highlighting
ethnic tensions, has been significantly more extreme in the case the country's ethnic Roma
minority. According to the European Commission census, as of 2012 approximately 490,000
Roma were living in Slovakia, contributing to 9.02 percent of the total population (European
Commission, 2014). Since Slovakia underwent revolutions in 1989, various nationalist
movements have targeted the Roma, and the various government assistances afforded to the
marginalized group, in what others (e.g. Dollard et al., 1939) have referred to as scapegoating.
According to Milo (2015, p. 227), in 2001, the largest number of racially motivated
crimes occurred in the Terencin region, in north-central Slovakia, which has had a history of
violent incidents incited by white nationalist, skinhead groups. Among racially motivated crimes
in Slovakia, the most common offense is the "support and propagation of movements which tend
toward the suppressing of human rights and liberties, in accordance with articles 260 and 261 of
the Penal Code" (Milo, 2015, p. 227).
Common especially in the 90's, attacks on Roma are often incited by local political
leaders seeking to demonstrate discontent over government services (e.g. housing, education),
specifically directed towards helping the Roma (Milo, 2005; Spac, 2014; Kluknavska & Smolik,
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2016, Mihalik, 2014). Jan Slota, leader of the Real Slovak National Party (henceforth referred to
as PSNS), a more radicalized offshoot of SNS, as well as mayor of the town of Zilina, has
frequently engaged in publicly scorning the various assistance programs (e.g. subsidies for
children, government jobs programs) offered to the Roma. In 2002, he stated in a public speech
that the Roma "produce children not for loving them, but because they view the kids as a moneymaking possibility" (Milo, 2005, p. 215). In 1999, at a political rally in central Slovakia, Slota
"accused all Roma of being criminals who rob and steal" (Milo, 2005, p. 233). During the
campaign for the parliamentary campaign in 2012, Jan Slota erected billboards, in towns with a
significant Roma population, which showed images depicting destitute Roma ghettos and
included one of his campaign catch phrases "How long will we pay for Gypsies" (Mihalik,
2014). During the same campaign, SNS purchased a series of billboards, showing the faces of
SNS frontrunners (including Jan Slota), which contained the catchphrase "Stop supporting the
parasites" (Mihalik, 2014). Similar anti-Roma rhetoric was also implemented by SNS in the 2010
parliamentary campaign, where SNS revealed a controversial billboard, which showed a heavily
tattooed, obese Roma man along with the catchphrase "Stop feeding those who do not want to
work" (Mihalik, 2014).
Mihalik (2015) analyzed data, collected via ethnographic field surveys conducted by the
European Commission funded MYPLACE (Memory, Youth, Political Legacy and Civic
Engagement) project, in two different locations in Slovakia, Rimavska Sobota and Trnava, to
determine which percentage of the youth population held negative dispositions toward the Roma
and Hungarian (Magyar) minorities. Rimavska Sobota is a small, economically lagging town in
the southern portion of the Banska Bystrica region, where radical far-right leader Marian Kotleba
serves as mayor. Trnava, located in the Kraj region approximately 47 kilometers north-east of
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Bratislava, is slightly more developed economically. Data from the MYPLACE project was
gathered through the deployment of both quantitative (n = 1,200) and qualitative (n = 60)
methods among youth, ages 15 to 25, in both regions (Mihalik, 2015). Mihalik (2015) notes that
similar past studies conducted in Slovakia (e.g. Public opinion related to right-wing extremism
(n=1005) have found that support for radical right-wing ideologies (e.g. attacks on minority
welfare packages, overt racism, ant-establishment) is most common among males, with limited
education, residing in small towns. Such individuals seem to gravitate to the SMER, SNS, and
L'S-HZDS parties (Mihalik, 2015).
According to his processing of qualitative data from the MYPLACE project, Mihalik
(2015) notes that it is especially common for non-Roma youth, when asked about their support
for the actions of various skinhead movements in the region, to endorse the response "I agree
with them, but I think it is not correct". Participants also usually stated that they believed the
police should by much stricter in controlling the Roma population (Mihalik, 2015). One
participant claimed in an open-ended question that "in Slovakia, it is normal that people have
issues against Roma. Young people are easy to influence and if they group around older who
share negative attitude against Roma they automatically consider it as true and valid" (Mihalik,
2015). Mihalik (2015) also processed the quantitative data from the MYPLACE project, which
was collected by surveying respondents on various anti-Hungarian and anti-Roma positions.
Results indicate that over 63 percent of participants, in the Rimavska Sobota region, endorsed
responses indicating an anti-Roma position. An ample youth population, experiencing economic
strife and harboring negative dispositions toward the Roma population, likely provided Marian
Kotleba and L'SNS with the fertile ground it needed to gain power utilizing rhetoric that attacked
the various economic assistance programs directed at the Roma. In the Trnava region, which
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continues to experience problems with political radicalization as new skinhead movements gain
traction, the percentage of youth holding anti-Roma dispositions is even higher at 79 percent
(Mihalik, 2015).
III. Poland
In recent years (Since 2015) it appears that active far-right populist parties in Poland (e.g.
PiS, Kukiz'15, PSL) are exhibiting the typical features associated to political radicalism. These
features include a political leader exhibiting authoritarian "strong man" tendencies, support to
override government institutions, rhetoric involving a rigid conception of national identity with
exclusive membership, and the justification of racism. Radicalized political parties often attempt
to remove the various government institutions (e.g. judicial systems, electoral laws) intended to
act as a system of checks and balances. Given the relative weakness of Poland's institutional
structure, where a party can easily obtain an absolute majority in its unicameral parliament, while
simultaneously securing the presidential seat (e.g. PiS in the 2015 elections), the possibility of a
radicalized party obtaining total control of the Polish government is very much plausible. If
political discontent were extreme among the population, for various reasons including economic
strife and a disdain for top-down policy implementation by the EU, a party could curry the
support for abolishing the country's constitution (e.g. Kukiz'15 during the 2015 campaign), and
radically change the institutional structure to consolidate power.
Typical of radicalized populist parties is an emphasis on a collective national identity,
with a common history. While in power, it appears that PiS is starting to abuse its power (as of
2018) to reconstruct a national identity and a common, 'heroic' history. On February 1st, 2018,
the PiS controlled Senate (with a presidential signature from PiS' Adrzej Duda) pushed through a
controversial new law that attaches a three year jail sentence to any individual found guilty of
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communicating any information suggesting that Poland was complicit in the Holocaust, or any
other war crime during the 20th century (e.g. Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968)
(Pankowski, 2018; Wielinski & Wyborcza, 2017). It appears that nationalist movements, which
received minimal support in the elections, may have played a role in coercing the legislation
through via threat (Pankowski, 2018). After the Senate passed the legislation, a presidential
signature was still needed. On February 5th, after some apparent presidential hesitation, the
radical far-right movements National Movement (RN) and National Radical Camp (ONR) held
demonstrations outside of the presidential palace, in view of Andrzej Duda (Pankowski, 2018).
After demonstrators repeatedly yelled several anti-Semitic remarks, a banner was exposed,
addressed directly at president Duda, which read "Take off your yarmulke: sign the bill!"
(Pankowski, 2018). The next day, president Duda signed the bill, bringing the legislation into
law (Pankowski, 2018).
The law incited a firestorm of diplomatic backlash, both from the United States and
Israel. After Israeli ambassador to Poland Anna Azari publicly scorned the law, a popular TV
personality and political commentator on Polish state TV, Rafal Ziemkiewicz, announced on his
Twitter account "For many years I have convinced people that we must support Israel. Today,
because of a few stupid and greedy scabs (emphasis added), I feel like an idiot" (Pankowski,
2018). The word parchy [scab] has traditionally been used as a derogatory term in radical Polish
anti-Semitic discourse and appears to be regaining popularity (Pankowski, 2018). After refusing
to apologize and delete the Tweet, it appears that Ziemkiewicz career has blossomed, and after
being implicated in a Tel Aviv University report on anti-Semitism, Ziemkiewicz announced that
his being labeled an anti-Semite was a mark of "professional success" (Pankowski, 2018).
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To correct the diplomatic blunder, in June of 2018, Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki
(also of PiS) urged parliament to amend the law to remove the possibility of a jail term, while
still retaining the infraction as a civil offense capable of being fined through the court system
(Ingber, 2018). According to Reuters, regarding the amendment, Morawiecki told lawmakers
that "those who say that Poland may be responsible for the crimes of World War Two deserve
jail terms", while also conceding "but we operate in an international context and we take that into
account" (Ingber, 2018). Later, in June of 2018, the Polish lower and upper house both voted to
amend the law and remove jail terms. A parliamentary member reportedly told Reuters staff that
the law was amended to help improve diplomatic relations with the United States "as a
deterrence policy against Russia" (Ingber, 2018).
Since securing a full parliamentary majority, along with the presidential seat, in 2015, the
far-right populist PiS has developed a track record of passing legislation to push a radicalized
agenda and remove those from office that disagree. In July of 2018, the PiS controlled
parliament passed legislation reducing the mandatory retirement age, for the supreme court, from
70 to 65 (Sobczak & Baczyska, 2018). The move appears to be a direct aggression against the
First President (i.e. leader) of the Supreme Court, Malgorzata Gersdof , who opposed the PiS
government and would be forced to retire under the new legislation. Moreover, the law also
required the immediate removal of 27 of the 73 supreme court justices, while simultaneously
expanding the supreme court to 120 members (Sobczak & Baczyska, 2018). Given that the
government would be allowed to appoint new justices, the law effectively grants PiS the ability
to reconfigure two thirds of the supreme court and stack the judiciary with members more partial
to PiS' agenda (Romo, 2018). President Andrzej Duda has stated publicly that the 'judicial
reform' legislation is intended to weed out corruption among Supreme Court justices, which has
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allegedly existed since the communist era (Romo, 2018). Shortly after PiS passed the judicial
'reform' legislation, the European Commission announced that it will undertake legal action
against the Polish government, stating that the new law "undermines the principle of judicial
independence, including the irremovability of judges" (Romo, 2018).
The European Commission has opened several separate litigation cases against the Polish
government related to violations of the rule of law, claiming that Poland has failed to maintain
their obligation to adhere to the EU Charter of Fundamental Human Rights. On July 2, 2018, the
European Commission sent a letter of formal notice to the Polish government, warning of
impending litigation if a proper response was not received within a month (European
Commission, 2018). After receiving a response from the Polish government, the European
Commission determined that "The response of the Polish authorities does not alleviate the
Commission's legal concerns" (European Commission, 2018). In August of 2018, the European
Commission maintained that "the Polish law on the Supreme Court is incompatible with EU law
as it undermines the principle of judicial independence, including the irremovability of judges,
and thereby Poland fails to fulfil its obligations under Article 19(1) of the Treaty on European
Union read in connection with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union" (European Commission, 2018). The European Commission has given the Polish
government one month to reverse their supreme court legislation and bring their laws back into
compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Human Rights. After resisting the European
Commission and failing to reverse the supreme court litigation, on September 24, 2018 the
European Commission announced in a press release that it would be referring Poland to the
European Court of Justice for egregious violations of the principle of judicial independence
(European Commission, 2018). PiS' behavior has also incited outrage among citizens residing in
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the generally economically prosperous regions in the west , where the Civic Platform has seen
considerable support. In response to the 'judicial reform' legislation, in July of 2018 thousands of
protesters congregated on the city of Krakow (bordering the Czech Republic), carrying copies of
the Polish constitution and chanting "Solidarnosc" (i.e. solidarity), as was once done during
protests against the communist regime (New York Times Editorial Board, 2018).
The popularity of radicalized populist parties in Poland, which discredit government
institutions to consolidate their power, is not only limited to the PiS party, but appears to be even
more extreme with the Kukiz'15 movement. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Kukiz'15, led by former
punk rock star Pawel Kukiz, rose to prominence just prior to the 2015 elections and secured an
impressive 42 seats in parliament, while Kukiz himself came in third place in the presidential
election (Marcinkiewicz & Stegmaier, 2016). Pawel Kukiz positioned himself as an antiestablishment, anti-system candidate with a radical vision of removing the constitution and
replacing the parliamentary system with a presidential system (Marcinkiewicz & Stegmaier,
2016).
Kukiz appears to have maintained contacts with Law and Justice (PiS) leader Jaroslaw
Kaczynski and may be playing an influential role in the recent anti-establishment policies (e.g.
supreme court overhaul) adopted by PiS (Szczerbiak, 2018). Kukiz'15 came out publicly as
strongly opposed to the European Commission's handling of the PiS governments recent judicial
overhaul and the impending ECJ litigation prompted by Article 7 "rule of law" concerns
(Szczerbiak, 2018). Playing on fears of Islamic terrorism in the region, Kukiz'15 has also
publicly supported the PiS government in their vehement opposition to the European Union's
refugee quota scheme. In June of 2016, Kukiz'15, along with the right-wing opposition National
Movement (RN), organized anti-immigration protests in several Polish cities (Radio Poland,
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2016). The previous month, Kukiz'15 had already started a petition on a referendum to prevent
the Polish government from accepting any individuals from the Middle East and North Africa
(Radio Poland, 2016). Pawel Kukiz told reporters that individuals coming from these regions
were too "culturally foreign", thus a threat to national sovereignty (Radio Poland, 2016). As
Szczerbiak (2018) notes, Kukiz' impulsive and emotional public persona, which departs
drastically from typical mainstream politicians, seems to be attracting voters as he is perceived as
authentically anti-establishment. If PiS fails to secure enough seats for an absolute majority in
the November 2019 parliamentary election, it appears that Kukiz'15 could realistically join them
as a coalition partner in a radicalized nationalistic government (Szczerbiak, 2018).
Along with the popularity of Kukiz'15, and other radical nationalist movements in
Poland, has come an increase in anti-Semitism, which is rather blatant in the public discourse
and appears to have increased dramatically around January of 2018 (Pankowski, 2018). Pawel
Kukiz, leader of Kukiz'15, has repeatedly made public remarks linking Jews with Communism,
while also blaming Jews for allegedly accusing Poles for being complicit in the Holocaust. Kukiz
told local reporters that "making Poles co-responsible for the holocaust is a moral and ethical
holocaust against the Poles" (Pankowski, 2018). Parliamentary member Marek Jakubiak, a
representative from Kukiz'15, has repeatedly made the case that Poles and Jews should be treated
as morally equivalent victims during the holocaust, and that the international community has
failed to properly acknowledge Polish suffering during the holocaust.
Even more extreme is the anti-Semitic rhetoric exhibited by president Andrzej Duda's
advisor and media representative Andrzej Zybertowic, who has previously made a career as a
sociologist, publishing articles on security issues in prominent Polish media (Pankowski, 2018).
Recently (as of 2018), Zybertowic publicly expressed arguments accusing an alleged globalist
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Jewish elite of planning the holocaust for the benefit of creating the state of Israel and bargaining
for Jewish superiority (Pankowski, 2018). In addressing reporters on the passage of the 2018
language law, which attaches a prison sentence to any individual accused of suggesting that
Poles were complicit in the holocaust, Zybertowic stated that "in this dispute one can see clearly
that Israel is fighting to keep a monopoly on the Holocaust. The 'religion' of the Holocaust has
become a symbolic shield for that country, which is used by Israel to create for itself a special
position in many places in the world - a shield meant to protect Israel against any criticism. And
now, Israel is afraid that Poland's IPN law will break its monopoly on the holocaust"
(Pankowski, 2018). Anti-Semitic comments like these have become quite common in the public
discourse in Poland. On the Twitter account for Polish state radio, political commentator Piotr
Nisztor stated that "if somebody acts as a spokesman for Israeli interests, maybe they should
think about giving up their Polish citizenship and accepting Israeli citizenship" (Pankowski,
2018).
IV. Hungary
After winning the 2010 election, Viktor Orban and Fidesz committed to a more
radicalized, populist agenda set on restoring and preserving national sovereignty. In the rhetoric
perpetuated by Fidesz, the left-liberal coalitions that previously led Hungary were accused of
corruption, as well as holding a parasitic, elitist position that placed supranational interests ahead
of the nation (Korkut, 2012, p. 166). Shortly after, Orban stated in a parliamentary speech that
"A new social contract evolved in the polling booths when Hungarians showed an unprecedented
agreement in overthrowing the old system and decided to build a new system of national
cooperation" (Korkut, 2012, p. 161). Orban repeatedly called for a "renewal" of the nation.
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In 2011, the Fidesz led government seized the opportunity that had been presented, with
their securing a two-thirds supermajority (i.e. 68% of the parliament exactly) and festering
political discontent following the 2006 protests and commenced formal procedures to pass a new
constitution that had been drafted. When placed to a vote, the parliament voted along party lines,
and the conservative Fidesz-KDNP coalition passed the new constitution, also known as the
"Fundamental Law" with relative ease. The "Fidesz" constitution came into effect on January 1st,
2012 (Brodsky, 2013). The new constitution included a potentially dangerous set of new laws
that aided its ability to consolidate centralized power, as well as construct and rigidify a common
national identity (Brodsky, 2013). Published on the official website of the Hungarian government
is a detailed description of the "Fundamental Law", where it is stated that a new constitution was
direly needed to " closed the door on the past in a symbolical sense, since our country was the
last one among the states of the former communist bloc to replace its Soviet model-based
constitution. The new Constitution opened a new chapter in the history of the country. The
former fundamental law, issued in 1949, has now been replaced by a Constitution written by
Hungary itself, committed to both national and European values" (The Official Website of the
Hungarian Government, 2018).
The new Hungarian "Fundamental Law" constitution also includes clauses that appear to
rigidify a common national identity, including an emphasis on a national language and a
common history. Written in the preamble of the constitution is the proclamation that "we are
proud that our king Saint Stephen built the Hungarian State on solid ground and made our
country a part of Christian Europe one thousand years ago", that "we recognize the role of
Christianity in preserving nationhood", and that "we commit to promoting and safeguarding our
heritage, our unique language, Hungarian culture" (The Official Website of the Hungarian
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Government, 2018). Article H, of the Foundation of the constitution, also states that "in Hungary
the official language shall be Hungarian" and "Hungary shall protect the Hungarian language"
(The Official Website of the Hungarian Government, 2018).
The new constitution also contains clauses which entirely annul any rulings made by the
Constitutional Court, prior to 2012, allowing the Fidesz government to operate on a 'clean slate'
(Brodsky, 2013). The fourth amendment made to the constitution radically changed the nature of
future campaiging, by making it illegal to advertise a political party through platforms other than
public media broadcasts. Broadcasts on public media channels are also screened by a
government media board, which originally had an equal representation of political parties, but
was taken over and controlled entirely by Fidesz when the constitution was passed (Brodsky,
2013). Previous laws incorporating the policy, in which one political party could gain sole
control over the government media board, were deemed unconstitutional by the Constitutional
Court prior to 2012; a ruling rendered obsolete by the new constitution (Brodsky, 2013;
Scheppele, 2013; The Political Capital Institute, 2018).
In December of 2011, Fidesz also utilized its supermajority to pass legislation to reshape
electoral districts (from 176 individual constituencies to 106) and shrink the National Assembly
(i.e. parliament) from 386 seats, to 199 (The Political Capital Institute, 2018). The restructuring
reduced the number of seats necessary for a supermajority to 100 (The Political Capital Institute,
2018). The move incited suspicions, from opposition parties and onlooking EU officials, of
gerrymandering on the part of Fidesz (The Political Capital Institute, 2018). With new laws to
consolidate power and skew the electoral system in their favor, the Fidesz-KDNP alliance was
able to seize control of parliament again in the 2014 parliamentary election, securing 133 of the
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(now) 199 seats in parliament, while the rival MSZP disbanded. Additionally, the radical, farright Jobbik party saw increased success, securing a 25.57% share of the parliamentary seats.
Viktor Orban has utilized conspiratorial rhetoric that targets an alleged Jewish-controlled
globalist political elite (a deep state behind the EU), which he, and other radical populists have
suggested, is attempting to change the demography of Europe and destroy national sovereignty
by integrating Muslim and Roma minorities. The leader (as it is perceived), behind this alleged
globalist deep state, is George Soros, a Jewish-Hungarian businessman and philanthropist that
has funded several human rights NGO's (e.g. The Open Society Foundations, The European
Roma Rights Center) and academic institutions (e.g. Central European University). The Open
Society Foundations (named after Karl Popper's book, The Open Society), do promote liberal
democratic values and equal opportunity to minority groups, as well as serving as watchdogs
against authoritarianism, perhaps why they may be perceived as a threat by populist political
entrepreneurs (Lyman, 2017).
István Németh, who campaigned on the regional electoral list in Budapest, for Fidesz,
between 2004 and 2006, and on the national list for Fidesz since 2014, has helped Viktor Orban
in constructing a campaign against George Soros, calling for a "de-Sorosization" of society
(Lyman, 2017). Referencing the American election of Donald Trump, Nemeth stated in an
interview that "I think they must be swept out, and now I believe the international conditions are
right for this with the election of a new president” (Lyman, 2017). In discussing with reporters
the nature in which populist movement in eastern Europe have scapegoated George Soros, Jan
Orlovsky, the director for the Open Society Foundations in Slovakia claimed "you couldn’t come
up with a better enemy figure today", " George Soros brings up all of the stereotypes we have
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lived with all our lives — about Jews, bankers and, in Slovakia, also about Hungarians" (Lyman,
2017).
Among the more recent legislative reforms introduced by the Fidesz government was an
anti-immigration legislative package, which has been termed the "Stop Soros" bill. The "Stop
Soros" bill attempts to impede NGO's from helping recent asylum seekers from the middle east,
by including vague language to criminalize the act of facilitating "illegal immigration" and
placing a steep 25% tax on human rights NGO's found to be "organizing immigration" (The
Political Capital Institute, 2018). The bill includes a "assisting illegal immigration" provision to
the Criminal Code, which attaches the possibility of imprisonment to "individuals or groups who
help migrants arriving to the country illegally or not entitled to international protection in
Hungary gain a legal status permitting the individual to stay in the country" (The Political
Capital Institute, 2018).
Among those effected by the "Stop Soros" bill is Hungary's Central European University,
a private, graduate-level liberal arts college that was founded, in 1991, through financial
contributions from George Soros. One of the central tenets behind the university's mission
statement is the promotion of values that support a free and open society, contributing to it being
perceived as a "bastion of liberalism" by the Fidesz lead government (BBC News, 2017; The
Official Website of Central European University, 2018). In April of 2017, the Hungarian
parliament, with a commanding vote of 123 to 38, passed legislation which stipulates that foreign
universities cannot operate in Hungary without being based in their home country, and with the
government's approval of the arrangement (BBC News, 2017). Because Central European
University (CEU) is funded by George Soros, who's operations are headquartered in New York,
CEO is considered by the government to be a foreign university (BBC News, 2017). To comply
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with the legislation, CEU opened academic courses at Bard College in New York (Walker,
2018). However, because the Fidesz government has failed to endorse paperwork to
acknowledge the agreement, CEU is currently (as of 2018) operating in a state of limbo and will
likely be forced to shut down (Walker, 2018). A CEU academic program, which offered free
college courses to asylum seekers, has already been forced to close because of the 25% tax
imposed by the "Stop Soros" bill (BBC News, 2017).
The Fidesz government is also passing legislation in an apparent attempt to remove the
judicial checks and balances, which previously existed in Hungary's institutional framework, by
restructuring the judiciary (The Political Capital Institute, 2018). In June of 2018, Minister of
Justice László Trócsányi submitted to parliament a legislative proposal, amendment 7 of the
constitution, which was introduced to establish the existence of an Administrative High Court,
will take over all competencies previously undertaken by the Hungarian Supreme Court (The
Political Capital Institute, 2018). Cases heard by the Administrative High Court will be those
involving appeals against state authorities, including cases regarding asylum, civil liberties,
complaints against police officers, public procurement, and tax decisions (The Political Capital
Institute, 2018). Researchers at the Political Capital Institute argue that the amendment
"undermines the separation of power", by mandating that judges interpret each case in line with
relevent legislation (The Political Capital Institute, 2018). The president of the Administrative
High Court will be appointed by the Fidesz controlled National Assembly, thus it is likely that
the appointee will be partial to Fidesz' agenda (Reuters Staff, 2018, The Political Capital
Institute, 2018). Viktor Orban had already tried to establish the court in 2016, which was blocked
by the Constitutional Court, necessitating the need for Fidesz to add amendment 7 (Reuters Staff,
2018). Justice Minister Laszlo Trocsanyi has denied allegations made by the opposition, which
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allege that Fidesz is attempting to stack the administrative high court with politically biased
Justices, by claiming that "for me the independence of judges is a fixed star of democracy" in a
hearing with Parliaments justice committee (Reuters Staff, 2018).
Attempts at undermining Hungary's judicial system stem back to the initial drafting of the
"Fidesz" constitution in 2011, where, like Poland, the retirement age for Hungarian judges was
lowered from 70 to 62 years of age (Halmai, 2017). When the new "Fundamental Law"
constitution came into effect on January 1st, 2012, 274 judges were forced into early retirement,
including 20 Supreme Court Justices (out of the 74 total) (Halmai, 2017). This allowed the
Hungarian parliament, controlled by Fidesz by a two-thirds supermajority, to appoint justices
that may be more partial to their nationalistic agenda.
In November of 2017, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) announced that it was
proceeding with litigation, Commission vs. Hungary (C‑286/12), for violating Articles 2 and 6(1)
of Council Directive 2000/78/EC, which establish a "general framework for equal treatment in
employment and occupation" to "combat discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief,
disability, age [emphasis added] or sexual orientation as regards employment and occupation"
(Halmai, 2017; Official Journal of European Communities, 2000). On November 6th, 2012, the
European Court of Justice announced that it found the Hungarian government guilty of violating
directive 2000/78/EC. Despite the ruling, the Hungarian government did not reinstate the judges
that were forced to retire and continued to pass legislation that would undermine the institutional
checks and balances supported by an impartial judiciary (Halmai, 2017).
In addition to the radicalization observed among the Fidesz party, Hungary has also seen
the rise in popularity of the Jobbik party, a more radicalized right-wing populist party fighting
for a Hungarian nationalism centered on conservative-Christian values (Varga, 2014; Karacsony
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& Rona, 2011). Among the political issues most hotly contested by the Jobbik party is the Roma
minority in the country, including how to handle the problems (e.g. high crime rate, the abuse of
welfare packages) posed by their segregation and a virulent criticism of the numerous integration
and assistance programs (e.g. NRIS) offered by NGO's (e.g. George Soros' European Roma
Rights Center) and mandated by the European Union (Korkut, 2012. pp. 185-188; Szabados,
2015; Karacsony & Rona, 2011). The Jobbik party has seen considerable support in recent
parliamentary elections, winning 16.67% of the seats in 2010, 20.22% of the seats in 2014, and
19.06% of the seats in 2018 (Szabados, 2015). By 2010, after the political turmoil and protests
in 2006, Jobbik was able to double its support base, relative to 2006 (Szabados, 2015). Public
opinion polls indicate that, as of 2015, the Jobbik party consistently ranks as the second largest
party (in terms of support base) behind Fidesz (Szabados, 2015, p. 50).
Before the rise of the Jobbik party, Hungary's Roma problem was considered a taboo
subject. After the communist regime fell in 1989, thousands of Roma, which had been employed
through government jobs, were left unemployed and resigned themselves to destitute, segregated
villages that still remain heavily reliant on government welfare packages (Szabados, 2015).
Parties on the left (e.g. MSZP) would campaign on increasing government spending for
assistance programs (e.g. child subsidies, job market training, education centers) and parties on
the right (e.g. Fidesz) would be accused of being racist if they attempted to criticize the
assistance programs (Szabados, 2015). This discourse was not highly visible, and evidence
points towards both parties engaging in corrupt practices to bribe Roma community leaders for
votes (Szabados, 2015). When Gabor Vona took control of the Jobbik party in 2006, he
positioned the Jobbik as a party that would break the silence on the Roma issue (Szabados, 2015;
Korkut, 2012. pp. 185-188). Gábor Vona, along with assistance from Fidesz officials, organized
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the Hungarian Guard, a radical conservative political movement that began to adorn outfits, worn
by Hungarian Nazis during WWII, and march through towns with a high percentage of Roma
inhabitants (Korkut, 2012. pp. 185-188; Szabados, 2015). Gabor Vona and the Hungarian Guard
continued to claim that they would fight against "Gypsy crime", as well as virulently criticize the
Hungarian political elite, and the EU, for avoiding the problem and lying to the public
(Szabados, 2015). Szabados (2015) also claims that Fidesz, in a bid to retain voters, adopted the
"Gypsy crime" phrase developed by the Jobbik party and radicalized its rhetoric towards Roma
assistance programs.
To compete with Fidesz, the Jobbik party has radicalized its rhetoric by accusing all of
those they ascribed as categorical outsiders (e.g. Roma, Jews, asylum-seekers) as being threats to
Hungarian sovereignty and security. This includes perpetuating a blatantly anti-Semitic and
conspiratorial discourse, which links Hungary's Jewish community to an alleged globalist
political elite and their use of the Roma as "biological weapons" (Human Rights First, 2015).
Eniko Hegedus, a member of parliament representing the Jobbik party, told reporters in 2011 that
“Now is the time to finally say: Israeli occupation is ongoing in our homeland. This is a fact, for
evidence we need only to think about the overwhelming dominance of Israeli capital
investments, property developments in Hungary. And the Gypsy people are a biological weapon
of this [Israeli occupation]. They use them as tools against the Hungarian people.” (Human
Rights First, 2015). Marton Gyongyosi, leader of Jobbik's Foreign Policy Cabinet and
parliamentary member, told reporters in 2012 that “I think now is the time to assess…how many
people of Jewish origin there are here, and especially in the Hungarian parliament and the
Hungarian government, who pose a national security risk to Hungary" (Human Rights First,
2015). Referencing bankers in the financial industry, Gabor Vona, the leader of the Jobbik party,
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told reporters in 2013 that “The Israeli conquerors, these investors, should look for another
country in the world for themselves, because Hungary is not for sale" (Human Rights First,
2015).
Interestingly, before the refugee crisis in 2015, the Jobbik party had adopted a peculiar
pro-Muslim stance, claiming Muslim nations as allies for (as they suggest) holding rigid
conservative values (Szabados, 2015). The party claimed that, like them, Muslims were against
the alleged liberal, globalist political elite, with the party leader Gabor Vona claiming publicly
that ‘Islam is the last hope for humanity in the darkness of globalization and liberalism’
(Szabados, 2015, p. 55). After the refugee crisis in 2015, to maintain its competitiveness against
the highly negative anti-immigration stance of Fidesz, the Jobbik party was forced to make an
immediate about face (Szabados, 2015). When the Fidesz government militarized the border
during the height of the refugee crisis, in September of 2015 (detailed in Chapter 2), the Jobbik
part engaged in inflammatory rhetoric. Gabor Vona told reporters, in September of 2015, that
"Hungary has to be able to turn back everyone who arrives at the Hungarian borders as an illegal
migrant — everyone without distinction. There is a real humanitarian catastrophe taking place
here, but the humanitarian catastrophe is not about what will happen to the poor immigrants. The
humanitarian catastrophe is what will happen to poor Hungary" (Human Rights First, 2015).
Exacerbating the perceived security threat and broadly referencing the middle east, parliamentary
member Marton Gyongyosi stated publicly that “even a child there knows how to assemble and
disassemble an AK-47, and I would not feel comfortable standing close to a person with such
skill" (Human Rights First, 2015).
The Political Capital Institute, a policy research and consulting firm in Budapest, which
is partially funded by George Soros' Open Society Foundation, has done research on which
99

segments of the Hungarian population are most susceptible to adopting radicalized political
views (e.g. racism, extreme nationalism, anti-establishment). Researchers note that far-right,
anti-establishment sentiments have risen significantly in recent years (The Political Capital
Institute, 2018). As researchers for the firm argue, "attitude radicals" are dissafected members of
the populous that are easily "seduced" by radical political movements claiming to fight for
national sovereignty and sweeping institutional change (The Political Capital Institute, 2012). It
is claimed that public confidence in Hungarian institutions has fluctuated significantly since the
transition. This has provided political entrepreneurs with a population willing to lend an ear to
their radical policies (e.g. constitutional overhauls, closing of borders), as well as pushing more
mainstream parties to the move their ideological positions, to the far ends of the political
spectrum, in a bid to maintain relevance (The Political Capital Institute, 2012).
The Political Capital Institute analyzed Hungary's susceptibility to radical right-wing
ideologies (in 2012, prior to the refugee crisis), by implementing a model known as the DREX
(Demand for Right Wing Extremism) index. Researchers at the Political Capital Institute
developed the DREX model by modifying multiple intercorrelated scales used in the European
Social Survey (ESS). A given country's DREX ranking is determined by the number of
respondents in a country who express holding at least three of the following political
dispositions, including prejudices, anti‐establishment attitudes, right‐wing value orientation and
fear, distrust and pessimism (The Political Capital Institute, 2012). The Political Capital Institute
conducted a series of surveys with Hungarian citizens, in Autumn of 2010 (around the same time
of the 2010 parliamentary election).
By surveying Hungarian citizens using their DREX index, researchers at The Political
Capital Institute (2012) found that, of those surveyed, 11% could be placed on the DREX index,
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making them easily susceptible to being "seduced" by extreme expression of right-wing
radicalism. Researchers involved in the project claim that the highest ratio of "attitude radicals"
can be found among Jobbik supporters, at approximately 30% of those surveyed (The Political
Capital Institute, 2012). Jobbik supporters also ranked the highest in terms of holding prejudicial
sentiments (e.g. negative attitudes towards those perceived as outsiders, including minorities and
immigrants) and anti-establishment values, while Fidesz supporters seem to rank the highest in
terms of holding a radical right-wing value orientation. Researchers also found that "48% of the
population over 16 is extremely prejudiced in Hungary, 20% can be described as anti‐
establishment, 32% expresses strong right‐wing values and 19% are characterized by fear,
distrust and pessimism" (The Political Capital Institute, 2012). The significant proportion of the
Hungarian population, already holding such radical views in 2013 and thus willing to lend an ear
to radicalized political rhetoric, provided populist political entrepreneurs with the fertile ground
they needed to push a radicalized agenda when the refugee crisis hit its peak in 2015. Evidence
suggests that such political dispositions seem to be most prominent among those inhabiting
small, economically lagging (i.e. high unemployment, low wealth) villages in Hungary, which is
addressed in depth in chapter 4 (Kracsony & Rona, 2011).
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Chapter 4
Conclusion: Converging Evidence

The case studies addressed in previous chapters are intended to build a body of evidence
which supports an explanatory template for the emergence of radical populist expressions in
Europe. The foundation of this template is formed through economically driven political
discontent, which emerges in situations where outdated industries are forced, through economic
liberalization, to compete with open market forces, while knowledge-based sectors simultaneously
thrive in an open, global market. This dynamic was evidenced especially in the case of Slovakia,
where the economically modernized Bratislava region prospered significantly after entering the
European Union, while outdated industries in eastern Slovakia were slow to modernize,
contributing to political disaffection among citizens in underdeveloped regions. Economic strife
on its own, however, is not sufficient enough to provide the fertile ground necessary for populist
political entrepreneurs to rise to the forefront of the national political scenes in their respective
countries.
As Judis (2016) explains, the European Union was developed with good intentions, set on
enhancing the prosperity of all its member states. However, "many Europeans have not seen their
benefits, particularly those who live in less prosperous nations within the Eurozone" (Judis, 2016,
p. 162). Although, overall, the general economic standing of these countries (GDP) has increased,
people seem to have reshaped their expectations and see that their economic standing has not
improved Judis (2016), quoting the economist Wynne Godley, includes in his text the statement:
"What happens in a whole country-a potential 'region' in a fully integrated community-suffers a
structural setback? So long as it is a sovereign state, it can devalue its currency. It can then trade
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successfully at full employment provided its people accept the necessary cut in their real incomes.
With an economic and monetary union, this recourse is obviously barred, and its prospect is grave
indeed unless federal budgeting arrangements are made that fulfill a redistributive role". As Judis
(2016) argues, a heavily centralized monetary union associated with the EU could potentially ease
economic distress through large-scale wealth distribution. However, other economic drivers in the
EU, like Germany and the northern European countries, are left at a disadvantage (i.e. providing
more to the EU than they get back) and are thus left with an argument which accuses
underdeveloped countries of free-riding. This dynamic motivates a proverbial tug of war during
times of economic global distress, which was seen especially during the Eurozone crisis, and
invariably contributed to frustrations with the EU and subsequent increases in Euroscepticism
(Clements, Nanou, & Verney, 2014).
Clements, Nanou, & Verney (2014) assessed attitudes towards the European Union, among
Greek citizens just prior to, and after the Eurozone crisis, by assessing responses to the
Eurobarometer survey. Prior to the Eurozone crisis, Greece was generally considered to be a Europositive country, evidenced through the resounding agreement with Eurobarometer responses
which indicate that Greece's membership in the EU has been a "good thing" and that the country
has benefitted since joining (Clements, Nanou, & Verney, 2014). Clements, Nanou, & Verney
(2014), in analyzing post-recession Eurobarometer data note that, after the Eurozone collapsed in
2008, during the subsequent period of economic stagnation (where Greece would receive multiple
EU/IMF bailouts) between November 2009 and November 2012, negative sentiments towards the
EU almost tripled, from 14% to 49%. Greece has also experienced the rapid rise of right-wing
populist parties (e.g. Golden Dawn) since the Euro crisis, which perpetuate a rhetoric that attacks
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the EU and, in extreme cases, has called for a referendum "Grexit" on leaving the EU (Georgiadou,
2013).
In the case of the EU, certain underdeveloped regions (e.g. eastern Slovakia, Hungary's
plains regions) remained heavily reliant on EU funding to prevent total economic collapse,
especially during the Eurozone crisis in 2008 (e.g. Greece). This same funding, usually involving
regional development packages, is also used as a lever to persuade countries to adopt minority
assistance policies (e.g. NRIS, refugee relocation). Resentment over the apparent loss in national
autonomy, due to reliance on compliance-contingent funding after exposure to the global market
forces associated economic liberalization, is central to a template for explaining the popularity of
populism. This dynamic leaves political entrepreneurs with a fertile ground to spread messages
involving national sovereignty. In the case studies discussed in previous chapters, where regions
experienced lagging economic conditions (e.g. unemployment, income inequality) because they
relied on outdated industries (e.g. labor-intensive agriculture, crude manufacturing), the rhetoric
of populist political entrepreneurs attempts to tap into resentment by blaming supranational
entities, like global financial institutions and the European Union. Rhetoric usually involves
criticizing such entities by claiming that they are operated by a corrupt, parasitic political elite that
does not care about the interests of the 'common man'. In extreme expressions of populist
radicalization, which was observed in both Hungary and Poland, political entrepreneurs resort to
claiming that a (primarily Jewish) globalist political and financial elite is in an antagonistic
relationship with the sovereignty and homogeneity of their respective countries.
The top-down policy implementation associated to supranational directives, involving
compliance with EU policies that mandate the adoption of assistance programs directed at specific
minority populations (e.g. refugee relocation obligations, NRIS programs) to maintain legal
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compliance, seems to be the final step in a general template that allowed radical populism to enter
the mainstream in European politics. As was seen in Slovakia, the National Roma Integration
Strategies framework, which mandated the development of assistance programs (e.g. child
subsidies, job training and placement, education funding) directed specifically towards the Roma
minority in the region, provided populist movements (e.g. SNS, L'SNS) with material to fuel their
rhetoric. Such rhetoric attacked the EU for undermining national sovereignty, as well as
perpetuated a disdain for the Roma minority. SNS campaign billboards reading "Stop supporting
the parasites" would soon follow (Mihalik, 2014).
In the case of European Council decisions 2015/1523 and 2015/1601, which mandated
that EU member states adopt an emergency relocation scheme during height of the refugee crisis
in 2015, member states were obligated to take in an EU allocated quantity of refugees. The mandate
was intended to relieve the burden on Greece in Italy, who received most of the refugees from the
Mediterranean, by relocating 40,000 (in decision 2015/1523) and 120,000 (in decision 2015/1601)
persons respectively (European Commission, 2015). Member states were legally mandated by the
EU to accept these refugees "according to Article 78(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU), in the event of one or more Member States being confronted by an
emergency situation characterized by a sudden inflow of nationals of third countries, the Council,
on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may adopt
provisional measures for the benefit of the Member State(s) concerned" (European Commission,
2015). In all the cases addressed in this research, the European Union's refugee relocation mandate
provided populist movements with the final push they needed to rally considerable support among
a population that was already dissafected by their economic standing and policy directives favoring
those perceived as outsiders (i.e. Roma). Populist political entrepreneurs would proceed to frame
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the refugee crisis as a threat to national sovereignty and security, drawing upon incidents like the
Paris attacks in November of 2015 and the New Year's Eve sexual assault case in Cologne, to fuel
their rhetoric. When the European Commission announced that it was suing the Czech Republic,
Poland and Hungary, for failing to accept any refugees and thus violating Article 78(3) of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, populist political entrepreneurs spun the
impending litigation as an afront to national autonomy. The European Union's top-down handling
of the refugee crisis, and other minority issues like those observed with the Roma, forms the final
component in a template which explains why populist movements have seen such support in recent
years.
To highlight which segments of the population tend to favor the ideologies associated to
radical populism (e.g. anti-establishment, nationalistic, anti-minority), I return to the case study
on Hungary. Kracsony & Rona (2011) investigated the extent to which certain variables (e.g.
gender, age, wealth, unemployment, anti-Roma attitudes, anti-Semitism) best predicted
Hungarians willingness to vote for Jobbik, as well Fidesz and MSZP. Researchers conducted an
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression, on such demographic, contextual, and attitudinal
variables, obtained from the 2009 Hungarian Election Study database, to determine which factors
were most strongly associated with a Hungarian citizens decision to support either party.
To obtain values for the dependent variable in their study, Kracsony & Rona (2011)
included responses regarding preferences, along a 7-point scale (1 = antipathy, 7 = sympathy), to
each party (Fidesz, MSZP, Fidesz), from the 2009 Hungarian Election Study (Note: this was
done prior to the immigration crisis and more recent expressions of radicalization). In the case of
the Jobbik, and to a slightly lesser extent Fidesz, results from the regression analysis seem to
support general arguments in the theoretical literature on ethnic competition, which claim that
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those inhabiting economically precarious positions in society (e.g. low skilled labor,
unemployed, uneducated, from small underdeveloped villages) would be more inclined, because
of pre-existing levels of political discontent associated to economic liberalization, to accept
radical populist movements exhibiting anti-minority tendencies (e.g. Banton, 1983; Olzak, 1992;
Kymlicka & Banting, 2006). For the variable, intended to be an indicator for general wealth,
Kracsony & Rona (2011) included a dichotomous variable, where a value of 0 would indicate the
lower quarter in their quantification of wealth, while a 1 would indicate the upper quarter in
wealth. For the Jobbik dependent variable, the wealth indicator shows a robust association of 0.096, at the p < 0.001 level of significance. Unemployment rate, treated similarly as a
dichotomous variable, also shows a moderately strong association of -0.113, at the p < 0.05
level of significance (Kracsony & Rona, 2011). These results indicate that those that are
unemployed, or inhabiting the lower socioeconomic rung in Hungary, are more likely to support
the Jobbik party. Among the sociodemographic variables was an indicator for the population size
of the respondent's respective town or village. Kracsony & Rona (2011) captured this by
including a dichotomous variable indicating if the respondent was from a small village (1), or a
mid-sized town (0). Results show a moderately strong coefficient, of - 0.086 at the p < 0.05 level,
indicating that those inhabiting small villages are significantly more likely to support the Jobbik
party. These results support the argument that those inhabiting a position of economic precarity
will be more willing to lend an ear to the radicalized rhetoric perpetuated by recent expressions
of populism throughout Europe.
Bartlett, Birdwell, Kreko, Benfield, & Gyori (2012), as part of a research team for the
Demos political think-tank in the United Kingdom (partially funded by George Soros' Open
Society Foundation), conducted research on open access Facebook data to assess the online
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behavior of Jobbik's Facebook followers. As they claim, "the rise of populism in Europe can be
traced through online behavior" Bartlett, Birdwell, Kreko, Benfield, & Gyori (2012).
Researchers gathered socioeconomic, age, and gender data from Hungarian citizens on Facebook
that were active fans of the Jobbik group page by utilizing publicly available advertising
information Bartlett, Birdwell, Kreko, Benfield, & Gyori (2012). Researchers note that the
majority (i.e. 71 %) of Jobbik's Facebook fans (n = 27, 140) are young males under 30, who
engage in an active dialogue "critical of globalization and the effects of international capitalism
on workers’ rights" and expressing concern for preserving national culture (Bartlett, Birdwell,
Kreko, Benfield, & Gyori, 2012). Of Jobbik's male Facebook fans, 73% completed elementary or
secondary school only, while 20% were college educated (Bartlett, Birdwell, Kreko, Benfield, &
Gyori, 2012). Bartlett, Birdwell, Kreko, Benfield, & Gyori (2012) also found that approximately
12% of Jobbik's followers were unemployed, with unemployment more likely among Jobbik's
followers that were over 30 years of age.
In the Karacsony & Rona (2011) regression, it was observed that those in small villages,
with limited education, and potentially facing unemployment, where significantly more likely to
support the Jobbik party. From the preliminary Facebook data obtained by Bartlett, Birdwell,
Kreko, Benfield, & Gyori (2012), it also appears that Jobbik's supporters are typically males with
limited education. From this, it can be inferred that the Jobbik's target demographic is largely
composed of young males, from economically precarious regions, that may be attempting to enter
the labor positions that were affected by economic liberalization. A population of low-skilled and
unemployed citizens, adversely affected by the open market forces associated to economic
liberalization and EU accession, would provide populist parties in Hungary with a dissafected
population primed to accept their radicalized platform. These results would seem to support
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research questions 1a (i.e. does political discontent seem to emerge in regions that have
experienced a negative economic impact (e.g. unemployment) after undertaking the economic
transformation associated to marketization and joining the European Union?) and 1b (i.e. are the
increases in the popularity of populist movements, distrust of mainstream political parties and the
European Union, and increases in the resentment of minority groups, more prevalent in regions
that are underdeveloped economically?). In all the case studies addressed in previous chapters,
populist political were indeed capable of securing greater vote share in regions that were lagging
economically. Presumably, the same regions whos economies relied on industries (e.g. laborintensive agriculture, crude manufacturing) that could not be sustained after the marketization that
occurred after EU accession.
To further investigate the issues that Jobbik supporters find most pressing, as well as their
attitudes towards the European Union, Bartlett, Birdwell, Kreko, Benfield, & Gyori (2012)
sampled a subset (n = 2,263) of Jobbik's Facebook followers and had them participate in an online
survey. In their survey, Bartlett, Birdwell, Kreko, Benfield, & Gyori (2012) presented participants
with 19 possible socio-political concerns and asked them to rank them. Among the potential
concerns, participants ranked the integration of Roma (28% ) and crime (26%) as the top two most
pressing problems in their country (Bartlett, Birdwell, Kreko, Benfield, & Gyori, 2012). Economic
issues, including Hungary's general economic standing (24%), unemployment (21% ), and rising
prices (19%), were also frequently ranked as most pressing (Bartlett, Birdwell, Kreko, Benfield,
& Gyori, 2012).
Bartlett, Birdwell, Kreko, Benfield, & Gyori (2012) also assessed attitudes towards the
European Union among the same sample taken from the Jobbik party's Facebook fans (n = 2,263),
which seem to be predominantly negative. Researchers asked participants "what the EU means to
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them personally", with over 67 % of males under 30, and 69% of females under 30, responding
with "loss of cultural and national identity" as their primary response (Bartlett, Birdwell, Kreko,
Benfield, & Gyori, 2012). Although participants did acknowledge the travel and work advantages
that come from open borders, the issues of government waste (53% total), bureaucracy (48% total),
unemployment (48% total), and increases in crime (43% total), are also frequent responses
(Bartlett, Birdwell, Kreko, Benfield, & Gyori, 2012).
Bartlett, Birdwell, Kreko, Benfield, & Gyori (2012) also investigated generalized trust, and
institutional trust, among their Jobbik Facebook sample (n = 2,263), while also comparing their
results to national Hungarian figures obtained from Eurobarometer survey data collected during
the same period. Approximately 42% of Jobbik's Facebook supporters agreed with the statement
"in general, most people cannot be trusted", which is remarkably low compared to the broader
Hungarian society, which was surveyed at 79% by the Eurobarometer (Bartlett, Birdwell, Kreko,
Benfield, & Gyori, 2012). This can potentially be explained by taking into consideration the social
world in which most Jobbik supporters occupy. As Kracsony & Rona (2011) showed, a significant
likelihood exists that Jobbik supporters will come from small villages, which typically incorporate
the types of tight-knit social networks that facilitate trust (i.e. social information is easily circulated
in small villages, allowing for efficient monitoring against free-riding) (Olson, 2009). When
Jobbik's Facebook supporters (n=2,263) were asked about their trust in government, the EU, trade
unions, traditional political parties, and the media, an entirely different effect emerged.
Bartlett, Birdwell, Kreko, Benfield, & Gyori's (2012) assessment of Jobbik's Facebook fans
shows that a resoundingly high level of institutional distrust existed among Jobbik supporters in
2012. Approximately 91% of the Jobbik supporters surveyed indicated that they did not trust the
government, compared to the 45% obtained from the general Hungarian public (Bartlett, Birdwell,
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Kreko, Benfield, & Gyori's, 2012). When asked whether they trusted the Hungarian judiciary
system, over 82% of Jobbik supporters responded that they distrusted the judiciary, while 43% of
the Hungarian general public, surveyed by the Eurobarometer, expressed a similar disposition
(Bartlett, Birdwell, Kreko, Benfield, & Gyori's, 2012). With a high level of institutional trust
already present among the Hungarian public, especially towards the government and judiciary
system, the Fidesz party was able to reach a significant subset of the population willing to lend an
ear to their new policies regarding constitutional and judicial overhauls. The same could be said
for media outlets. Among the Jobbik supporters surveyed by Bartlett, Birdwell, Kreko, Benfield,
& Gyori (2012), approximately 92% of those surveyed expressed that they did not trust the press,
while 52% of the Hungarian general public expressed a similar disposition. Fidesz policy regarding
electoral campaiging and the governments media advisory board (detailed in Ch. 3) likely found a
receptive audience. Finally, approximately 88% of the Jobbik supporters surveyed indicated that
they distrusted the European Union, compared to 30% of the Hungarian general public Bartlett,
Birdwell, Kreko, Benfield, & Gyori (2012). These results indicate that, prior to the refugee crisis
in 2015, a significant portion of the Hungarian public, primarily those in economically
underdeveloped regions, was already primed to accept a radicalized rhetoric that would attack the
European Union and the mainstream political establishment. When the refugee crisis hit in 2015,
and the EU subsequently enacted its refugee relocation scheme, populist political parties in
Hungary (e.g. Jobbik, Fidesz), and throughout the EU (below), were handed the perfect issue to
crystalize political discontent and rise to the forefront of European politics.
All research seems to point towards the refugee crisis as the central issue that provided
populist movements with the fertile ground they needed to rise to prominence. This effect is not
just isolated to the study cases addressed in previous chapters (Slovakia, Poland, Hungary), but
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appears to have influenced politics in all EU member states that have experienced immigration
problems in some form. Podnobik, Jusup, Kovac, and Stanley (2017) have investigated extensively
the relationship between immigration and the associated increase in the popularity of far-right
populist parties. Researchers assessed voting data from EU countries most affected by the refugee
crisis (e.g. Greece, Italy, Norway, Sweden, France) that peaked in September of 2015 (detailed
further in Chapter 2), which placed a burden on Greece and Italy, who received a
disproportionately large number of refugees, thus prompting the EU to implement an obligatory
refugee relocation program. Podnobik, Jusup, Kovac, and Stanley (2017) quantified the number of
immigrants in each country, from September 2013 to September 2016, by assessing the number of
visa applications and, by fitting a cumulative exponential function to the data, showed how this
relates with the vote share percentage obtained by parties that could be classified as right-wing
populist. In their analyses of the results (Figure 3, below), Podnobik, Jusup, Kovac, and Stanley
(2017) conclude that "among the EU countries involved in the recent migrant crisis, support for
RW (i.e. right-wing) populism is generally higher in those countries that accepted a larger number
of immigrants relative to the country’s population size" (p. 3). The isolation of Austria, by
Podnobik, Jusup, Kovac, and Stanley (2017), is especially relevent for the discussion considering
that it experienced a significant increase in immigration (i.e. primarily refugees) after the refugee
crisis hit its peak in September of 2015. The crisis seems to have prompted a political dialogue
that fueled the rhetoric of the right-wing populist Freedom Party of Austria (FPO), which framed
the situation as a threat to national security and sovereignty in its rhetoric leading to the 2017
election (Rheindorf & Wodak, 2017; BBC 2017). When the refugee crisis was underway, and the
EU initiated its obligatory relocation scheme, the FPO called for an increase in border security and
urged the government to implement a "maximum limit" in the number of asylum applications it
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would accept (Rheindorf & Wodak, 2017). The FPO also suggested, in its party manifesto, that
benefit allocations to refugees be capped at a marginal level and to bar any new immigrants from
receiving state welfare benefits until they have lived in Austria for five years (BBC, 2017). In a
nod to the campaign run by American President Donald Trump, FPO featured the slogan "Austria
First" prominently on the front page of its part website leading up to the election (Bleiker, 2018).

Figure 3: The relationship between the percentage of right-wing populist vote share (y axis)
and percentage of new immigration visas in relation to the total population (x), among EU
countries that have experienced significant immigration from September 2013 to September
2016. Both the linear fit, and cumulative exponential curve (solid) is shown. All countries are
combined in (a), while the affect is isolated to Austria (local elections as data points) in (b).
From: Podnobik, Jusup, Kovac, and Stanley (2017)

Rheindorf and Wodak (2018) analyzed the rhetoric implemented by key political figures
in Austrian media, regarding the refugee crisis and subsequent immigration waves. Specifically,
the occurrence of semantic fields (i.e. framing methods) in Austrian media, associated to the two
discourse strands, the building of a border fence and implementing a national limit on the number
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of asylum applications accepted. Rheindorf and Wodak (2018) quantified how often dialogue
regarding both policy considerations occurred in Austrian newspapers during a period, from April
2015 to February 2016, where the refugee crisis was hotly contested by politicians in Austrian
media. As Rheindorf and Wodak (2018) state in their analysis, the FPO seems to have been the
most prolific perpetuator of such rhetoric, while the incumbent OVP contributed to a lesser extent.
In their analysis on framing strategies, Rheindorf and Wodak (2018) note that the emphasis on the
threat posed by immigration, most commonly the threat of terrorism, is used most frequently in
the anti-immigrant discourse. It appears that both parties (i.e. OVP and FPO) draw reference to
incidents, like the November 2015 Paris attack and the New Year's Eve sexual assault in Cologne,
to incite fear and curry support for their anti-immigration platform.
The FPO party did especially well in the 2017 parliamentary election, winning 51 seats in
a 5.5% upward swing from the 2013 election, the closest a third party has come to defeating the
dominant OVP (Austrian People's Party) and SPO (Social Democrat Party of Austria) parties since
WWII. After the election, FPO joined, as a junior partner, in a coalition with the conservative
OVP, which won 62 seats in Austria's 182 unicameral parliament. Public opinion polling in Austria
(Figure 4.2, below) shows that the FPO party experienced a relatively substantial increase in
popularity around the time that the refugee crisis hit its peak in September of 2015, with a
momentum that seems to have led directly into the 2017 election.
More recently (as of 2018), it appears that the FPO has radicalized its rhetoric regarding
the refugee situation, of which Austria is still attempting to negotiate. Vice Chancellor HeinzChristian Strache (of FPO) publicly suggested a policy where asylum seekers, still waiting for
application acceptance from the crisis in 2015, should be detained in Army barracks until their
applications for asylum have been processed (Bleiker, 2018). Regarding the policy suggestion,
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Strache stated in an interview on Austrian public television that "We need order as long as there is
an open asylum application process" (Bleiker, 2018). The OVP-FPO coalition has voiced even
more contentious policy recommendations, all aligning with the rhetoric voiced by FPO, which
frames asylum seekers as a serious security threat. In their published government program, the
coalition has expressed intentions to pass legislation to relinquish assets from asylum applicants
and use it to fund basic services for those waiting for approval (Bleiker, 2018). The coalition also
intends to pass legislation mandating that asylum applicants turn their phones over to authorities
to gather data for intelligence purposes, as well as require doctors to forgo client-patient
confidentiality and share medical records with authorities (Bleiker, 2018).
In addressing research question 2 (i.e. has there been a marked change in how populist
movements express themselves politically (e.g. emphasis on specific issues, rhetorical framing
strategies) in Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia since the refugee crisis in 2015?), to date, no research
exists that has quantified the rhetoric of populist political entrepreneurs, in Slovakia, Poland, or
Hungary, and investigated the extent to which their addressing of minorities has changed (i.e. less
emphasis on Roma, more emphasis on immigration) prior to, and after the refugee crisis. Based on
the rhetoric that was pulled from reports on public dialogue, it appears that, in all the case studies
addressed, the immigration issue has been prioritized over rhetoric that directly criticizes the Roma
and welfare assistance packages (e.g. child subsidies, jobs programs). When the Roma are
addressed, post refugee crisis, it appears that integration and assistance programs are criticized for
their link to George Soros' Open Society Foundations (seen especially in Hungary) and an alleged
globalist political elite. The Roma now appear to be treated as belonging to a broader category of
outsider, considered as foreign invaders, and used as a tool by this alleged globalist elite to destroy
the homogeneity and sovereignty of their respective countries. Thus, after the refugee crisis it
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appears that anti-Roma rhetoric hasn't necessarily increased but is now used to contribute to a
broader rhetorical argument, which accuses an alleged EU elite of using those that are "culturally
foreign" to undermine the homogeneity and sovereignty of their respective countries.
In summary, as Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary transitioned from communism, the initial
"shock therapy" associated to economic liberalization would cause an initial economic recession,
with significant lulls in the unemployment rates of the respective case studies. Those regions most
affected were those incorporating outdated industries (e.g. labor-intensive agriculture, steel
manufacture) that had been sheltered from open market forces by the communist regime. Lagging
economic conditions among these regions would subtly improve into the early 2000's, and with
EU accession, as regional development and social funds could be used for assistance. Meanwhile,
modernized regions (e.g. Bratislava, Warsaw, Budapest), that had incorporated knowledge-based
sectors, would experience a significant economic increase from the streamlined economic
coordination that would come from EU accession and opening to a broader European market. This
economic increase, by and large, was not experienced in underdeveloped regions, contributing to
an element of political disaffection by those that had not benefitted from EU accession and opening
to the broader European market. Regional economic disparities were evidenced especially in the
cases of Slovakia and Hungary, who would experience an increase in GINI directly after entering
the EU.
After the Eurozone crisis in 2008, disaffection would be compounded, providing populist
political entrepreneurs with a significant subset of the population, primarily residing in regions
with underdeveloped industries (e.g. agriculture, mining, crude manufacturing), willing to lend an
ear to their platform. When the European Union started to mandate that its members adopt
assistance programs (e.g. NRIS), specifically targeting minorities that have posed a significant
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integration problem, populist politicians would incorporate in their rhetoric a virulent criticism of
those assistance programs, claiming that the resources should be redirected to the 'native'
population; a discourse that would be especially appealing to those in positions of economic
precarity. This dynamic was indeed evidenced in the case of SNS and L'SNS in Slovakia, Fidesz
and Jobbik in Hungary, and PiS in Poland.
Finally, when the refugee crisis, incorporating approximately 1.2 million individuals
fleeing the war-torn Middle East and North Africa, hit its peak in September of 2015, the European
Union implemented an obligatory refugee relocation scheme to relocate 120,000 individuals and
relieve the burden on Italy and Greece (Zaun, 2018). This program would provide populist political
entrepreneurs, who were already capable of tapping into various forms of regional discontent, with
the perfect issue to signal their firm stance against a supposed parasitic political elite in the EU
and crystallize their support to rise to the forefront of the political scenes in their respective
country. In the case of Poland and Hungary, who's institutional systems were especially weak (e.g.
unicameral parliaments), populist movements that obtained parliamentary supermajorities would
proceed to overhaul the political systems in their countries, by attacking their constitution, electoral
laws, and judicial systems, to centralize and consolidate their power. When the EU attempted to
intervene with litigation, to discipline against legislation that attacked the impartiality of
judiciaries, as well as policies that refused to accept refugees, populist political entrepreneurs
would manipulate these situations to again fuel their rhetoric. This rhetoric, which would become
increasingly radicalized up to 2018, would attack the EU elite by claiming that their policies are
specifically engineered to steadily chip away at national sovereignty.
The approach taken by this research did not take a rigorous scientific approach to confirm
hypotheses associated to the research questions above, but rather, offer evidence for evaluating the
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plausability of a situational template that explains why populist movements have been capable of
rising to the forefront of European politics. Currently, parties that have obtained centralized
government control (e.g. PiS, Fidesz), are in a proverbial tug of war with the European Union,
whos limited sanctioning mechanisms include pulling funding, imposing fines and limiting voting
in the European Parliament. As populist governments continue to violate the institutional pillars
of liberal democracy, including the impartiality and irremovability of judges, as well as sound
electoral laws, the European Union is limited to imposing such sanctioning mechanisms to curb
the behavior. Populist governments are then able to manipulate such sanctions to fuel their rhetoric
against an alleged supranational political elite. It appears that the "top-down" manner in which the
EU implements policies has not worked especially well in certain underdeveloped regions, which
would seem to necessitate the need for research on alternative approaches to handling pressing
problems such as the integration of immigrant and minority groups. The approach of applying
supranational policies uniformly across countries and regions with varying economic, social, and
institutional dynamics may need to be curtailed in favor of a "ground-up" approach to governance.
With such a "ground-up" approach, policies are tailored at the local-level by considering specific
regional circumstances and, depending on their success, are adopted at the national and
supranational level. Of course, a considerable ammount of research is needed to more definitively
determine the extent to which the EU has contributed to the current "populist backlash" and how
best to correct the problem it poses for the future of liberal democracy.
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